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“Coordinating” with the Federal Government:
Assessing County Efforts to Control Decisionmaking on Public
Lands
Michael C. Blumm*
James A. Fraser**
Resentment of the federal government’s management of public lands runs
deep in the arid West, where grazing, mining, and timber once
predominated and remain important to rural communities. This
resentment bubbled over in 2016 with the armed occupation of the
Malheur National Wildlife Refuge in eastern Oregon and the ensuing
acquittal of the occupants of criminal wrongdoing. Less violent
manifestations of dissatisfaction in the rural West are playing out in the
enactment of county land use ordinances that attempt to gain control over
federal land management. These ordinances, encouraged by interest
groups such as the American Legislative Exchange Council and the
American Stewards of Liberty, raise serious questions about the
relationship between federal and local government in federal land
planning.
In this article, we examine an archetypical county ordinance from Baker
County, Oregon and explain that most of its provisions are preempted by
federal law and, therefore, unenforceable. Although statutes like the
Federal Land Policy and Management Act and the National Forest
Management Act encourage cooperation between local governments and
federal land planners, they do not authorize local land-use control on
public lands. Thirty years ago, in the leading decision of Granite Rock v.
California Coastal Commission, the United States Supreme Court drew a
sharp distinction between permissible state and local environmental
regulation and impermissible land use planning, a distinction that lower
courts have maintained over the years.
Ordinances like Baker County’s, which are proliferating throughout the
rural West, fail to observe the distinction drawn by the Court, and
consequently include numerous local land use directives that are
preempted by federal law. Although we believe that local involvement can
*
Jeffrey Bain Faculty Scholar & Professor of Law, Lewis and Clark
Law School; L.L.M. 1979, George Washington University Law School; J.D. 1976,
George Washington University Law School.
**
J.D. 2017, Lewis and Clark Law School; B.A., Robert D. Clark
Honors College, University of Oregon.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2920355

2017

PUBLIC LAND & RESOURCES LAW REVIEW

2

help to improve federal land planning, we show how and why local
ordinances attempting to prescribe land uses on federal public lands
conflict with federal law, and mislead their supporters into believing the
plans are enforceable.
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III. STATUTORY AND REGULATORY CONTEXT: NFMA AND FLPMA ... 17
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B. County Plans and Conflict Preemption ...................................... 43
VI. WHAT CAN COUNTIES ACTUALLY DO? ........................................... 48
VII. CONCLUSION ................................................................................... 53
I. INTRODUCTION
In the arid West, many politicians and local governments resent
the federal government for its public land ownership and management.
The Sagebrush Rebellion in the 1970s 1 and the County Supremacy
movement in the 1990s 2 reflected this hostility towards federal agencies.
1.
The Sagebrush Rebellion was largely a reaction to the enactment of
the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-576, 90 Stat.
2728 (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1787 (2012)). During the rebellion, several
states—including Nevada, Arizona, New Mexico, and Utah—enacted laws asserting
state control over public lands. See Robert Fischman & Jeremiah Williamson, The
Story of Kleppe v. New Mexico: The Sagebrush Rebellion as Un-Cooperative
Federalism, 83 U. COLO. L. REV. 123, 158 (2011) (“The Sagebrush Rebellion began
as narrowly focused rancher frustration with the [Wild Free-Roaming Horses and
Burros Act of 1971], and in less than half a decade grew to encompass a wide array
of public land conflicts. Nevada . . . led the movement for greater state control of
public lands, advancing a regional political agenda.”). The rebellion came shortly
after the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Kleppe v. New Mexico that Congress may
preempt state laws to protect wildlife on public lands. 426 U.S. 529, 546 (1976).
2.
The County Supremacy movement was a period in the early 1990s
when “approximately thirty-five counties adopted ordinances asserting authority over
federal lands.” Elizabeth Osenbaugh & Nancy Stoner, The County Supremacy
Movement, 28 URB. LAW. 497, 498 (1996); see also Boundary Backpackers v.
Boundary Cnty., 913 P.2d 1141, 1143 (Idaho 1995) (county ordinance that required
federal government to comply with county land use plan was preempted and therefore
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On January 2, 2016, the issue grabbed national news headlines when
militants took control of the Malheur National Wildlife Refuge in
southeastern Oregon. 3 These radicals—heavily armed and wearing
cowboy hats—seized the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service-managed land in
protest of federal regulation of grazing permits for environmental
purposes, as well as the prosecution, conviction, and sentencing of two
Oregon ranchers for setting fire to federal public lands.4
Although much national attention concerning local control over
public lands focused on the “Malheur Occupation,” western counties are
quietly passing ordinances that assert a government-to-government role in
managing public lands alongside federal agencies.5 The counties rely on
provisions in the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976
(“FLPMA”) 6 and the National Forest Management Act of 1976
(“NFMA”) 7 that direct federal agencies to “coordinate” with state and
invalid); Scott Reed, The County Supremacy Movement: Mendacious Myth
Marketing, 30 IDAHO L. REV. 525, 527 (1994) (“The county supremacy movement is
a new version of the Sagebrush Rebellion, which in turn was simply another spin on
how to place the public lands under control of the private commercial users.”).
3.
See, e.g., Les Zaitz, Militia Takes Over Malheur National Wildlife
Refuge Headquarters, THE OREGONIAN (Jan. 2, 2016), http://www.oregonlive.com/
pacific-northwest-news/index.ssf/2016/01/drama_in_burns_ends_with_quiet.html;
Kirk Johnson & Jack Healy, Armed Group Vows to Continue Occupation at Oregon
Refuge, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 3, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/04/us/armedgroup-vows-to-hold-federal-wildlife-office-in-oregon-for-years.html.
4.
See Kirk Johnson & Jack Healy, Protestors in Oregon Seek to End
Policy That Shaped West, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 5, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/
2016/01/06/us/protesters-seek-to-end-policy-that-shaped-west.html; see also Greg
Walden, Congressman, 2nd District of Oregon, Address to the U.S. House of
Representatives (Jan. 5, 2016), transcript available at https://walden.house.gov/
speech (reviewing the prosecution of ranchers Dwight and Steve Hammond and
discussing the rancor between livestock producers and the federal government in
eastern Oregon).
5.
See Amanda Peacher, Counties Turn to Little-Known Policy to Boost
Say in Federal Land Management, OREGON PUBLIC BROADCASTING (Apr. 4, 2016),
http://www.opb.org/news/series/burns-oregon-standoff-bundy-militia-newsupdates/federal-land-management-oregon-counties/.
6.
43 U.S.C. § 1712(c)(9) (2012) (in developing and revising federal
land plans, the Secretary shall “to the extent consistent with the laws governing the
administration of the public lands, coordinate the land use inventory, planning, and
management activities of or for such lands with the land use planning and management
programs of other Federal departments and agencies and of the States and local
governments within which the lands are located.”) (emphasis added).
7.
16 U.S.C. § 1604(a) (2012) (“[T]he Secretary of Agriculture shall
develop, maintain, and, as appropriate, revise land and resource management plans for
units of the National Forest System, coordinated with the land and resource
management planning processes of State and local governments and other Federal
agencies.”) (emphasis added).
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local governments in the land planning process. 8 These local
“coordination” ordinances, usually in the form of a “natural resources
plan,” aim to impose county policies on federal land managers by
demanding they conform to county positions.9 This Article examines the
authority of such ordinances and contends that in most instances county
directives are preempted by federal law and unenforceable under the
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, 10 and case law
including California Coastal Commission v. Granite Rock Co.11
Rural western communities have been dissatisfied with federal
land management decisions, blaming environmental regulation, litigious
advocacy groups, and recreational users of public lands for stifling local
economies long dependent on ranching, logging, and mining. In 2012, the
Utah legislature passed the Utah Transfer of Public Lands Act, demanding
that the federal government cede public lands in Utah to the State by
2014,12 notwithstanding the fact that studies have consistently shown state

8.
See Peacher, supra note 5 (“Baker and Malheur Counties [Oregon]
already adopted natural resource plans under the coordination premise. Efforts are
underway in at least four other [Oregon] counties to do the same. Their idea is that if
local governments set out their priorities and vision for public lands, then federal
agencies have to adjust management practices to align with their plan.”).
9.
See, e.g., BAKER COUNTY, OREGON, NATURAL RESOURCES PLAN 23
(July 20, 2016) [hereinafter BAKER COUNTY PLAN] (“Federal and State agencies shall
not encourage the relinquishment of, nor allow the retirement of, grazing permits on
designated grazing lands (i.e. grazing districts) for uses that exclude substantive
livestock grazing.”); id. at 27 (“On public lands, all tree mortality caused by forest fire
and pests shall be harvested before additional loss of economic value occurs, in
coordination with the Baker County Board of Commissioners.”).
10.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
11.
California Coastal Comm’n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572, 594
(1987) (deciding that states may require environmental protection measures for uses
of federal public lands, but federal land planning preempts state and local planning).
12.
H.R. 148, 59th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Utah 2012); see Nick Lawton,
Utah’s Transfer of Public Lands Act: Demanding a Gift of Federal Lands, 16 VT. J.
ENVTL. L. 1, 15 (2014) (“Although the TPLA requires the U.S. to convey lands to
Utah, it does not require the state to pay fair market value—or any value at all. The
TPLA simply requires Congress to ‘extinguish title’ to the lands and ‘transfer title’ to
the state.”); see also PETER MICHAEL ET AL., REPORT OF THE PUBLIC LANDS
SUBCOMMITTEE (Conference of Western Attorneys General, 2016) (examining legal
issues of federal land ownership in the West, and adopting by 11-1 vote the Paper’s
conclusions that states have scant legal authority to demand transfer of public lands);
ROBERT B. KEITER & JOHN C. RUPLE, A LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE TRANSFER OF PUBLIC
LANDS ACT 6 (Univ. of Utah, Wallace Stegner Ctr. for Land, Resources & Env’t,
2014) (“Statutes authorizing Western states to join the Union required those same
states to disclaim the right to additional lands and that disclaimer cannot be spun into
a federal duty to dispose. Statehood enabling acts’ guarantee of equal political rights
also cannot be spun into a promise of equal land ownership. Furthermore, though
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governments do not have the budgetary or administrative resources to
manage the public land acreage. 13 At the federal level, Utah’s
representatives support legislation that would limit the federal
government’s ability to manage public lands in Utah.14 Unsurprisingly,
many public lands users, like hunters and anglers, are vehemently opposed
to proposals that would “defederalize” public lands or “transfer” public
lands to the states.15
statehood enabling acts guarantee states a share of the proceeds resulting from federal
land sales, that guarantee is not an obligation to sell.”).
13.
See, e.g., ELISE STAMBRO ET AL., AN ANALYSIS OF A TRANSFER OF
FEDERAL LANDS TO THE STATE OF UTAH 123 (Univ. of Utah, Bureau of Econ. & Bus.
Research 2014), available at http://publiclands.utah.gov/wp-content/uploads/2014/
11/1.%20Land%20Transfer%20Analysis%20Final%20Report.pdf (estimating that
Utah would have to generate $280 million annually to cover the management costs of
transferred public lands); JAY O’LAUGHLIN, WOULD A TRANSFER OF FEDERAL LANDS
TO THE STATE OF IDAHO MAKE OR LOSE MONEY? (Univ. of Idaho, Policy Analysis
Group, 2014), available at http://posting.boiseweekly.com/media/pdf/pagib16_federal-land-transfer__1_.pdf (estimating that transfer would cost Idaho up to
$111 million annually); CTR. FOR WESTERN PRIORITIES, THE MINING BURDEN: STATES
WOULD SHOULDER SIGNIFICANT COSTS OF CLEANING UP ABANDONED MINES IF THEY
TAKE OVER AMERICAN LANDS 2 (2015) (“We estimate that should state land takeover
efforts move forward, 13 Western states would be saddled with between $9.6 and $21
billion in costs of cleaning up the approximately 100,000 abandoned mines that exist
on public lands today.”) (emphasis omitted).
14.
See, e.g., Utah National Monument Parity Act, S. 3317, 114th Cong.
(2016) (proposing to prohibit Presidents from designating national monuments in
Utah); Local Enforcement for Local Lands Act of 2016, H.R. 4751, 114th Cong.
(2016) (proposing to terminate the Forest Service and BLM’s law enforcement
functions on public lands); Greater Sage Grouse Protection and Recovery Act, H.R.
4739, 114th Cong. (2016) (proposing to require that federal sage grouse recovery
plans be consistent with state plans).
15.
According to knowledgeable commentators, state ownership of
federal lands—and the concomitant obligations requiring maximized revenue
generation on state lands—would adversely affect:
access to the transferred lands. Increased mineral development
would displace other users, and land managers would likely
increase access fees. In Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, and
Wyoming, upwards of 75-percent of hunters utilize public lands.
In Colorado, Idaho, and Oregon, the figure is 54-, 66-, and 67percent, respectively. Access to state trust land is already costly,
and it foreshadows additional costs if the transferred lands are
managed with an eye towards market efficiency. During 2014, the
Utah Division of Wildlife Resources paid $703,550 to [The Utah
School and Institutional Trust Lands Administration] ‘to provide
compensation to Utah’s school and institutional trust beneficiaries
for public access to school and institutional trust lands for hunting,
fishing, trapping, and viewing of wildlife.’ In addition to Utah,
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state trust land managers in Colorado, Montana, Nebraska, New
Mexico, Oklahoma, and Texas all required some form of payment
to hunt, fish, or camp on state trust lands. Arizona, Washington
State, Louisiana, and Minnesota also impose recreation user fees.
ROBERT B. KEITER & JOHN C. RUPLE, THE TRANSFER OF PUBLIC LANDS MOVEMENT:
TAKING THE ‘PUBLIC’ OUT OF PUBLIC LANDS 5 (Univ. of Utah, Wallace Stegner Ctr.
for Land, Resources & Env’t, 2015); see also Jason Blevins, Sportsmen,
Conservationists Want Answers From Candidates on Public Land Transfers, THE
DENVER POST (Sept. 21, 2016), http://www.denverpost.com/2016/09/21/sportsmenconservationists-candidates-reject-public-lands-transfer/ (“Sportsmen tend to think
that a large-scale transfer of federal lands to states would throttle their access to prime
playgrounds.”); Jamie Williams, You Can’t ‘Take Back’ Public Lands. They Already
Belong to All of Us, THE WASHINGTON POST (Jan. 25, 2016), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2016/01/25/you-cant-take-back-publiclands-they-already-belong-to-all-of-us/ (president of the Wilderness Society arguing
for retained federal ownership of public lands); COLORADO COLLEGE, 2016
CONSERVATION IN THE WEST POLL (State of The Rockies Project, 2016), available at
https://www.coloradocollege.edu/other/stateoftherockies/conservationinthewest/
(majority of voters in Arizona, Colorado, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, and
Wyoming oppose disposal of public lands); Trout Unlimited, Our Public Lands Are
Not For Sale, TU.ORG, http://www.tu.org/public-lands-action (last visited May 4,
2017) (“Sportsmen and women know that public lands provide access to some of the
best hunting and fishing in their states—and these wild lands also help ensure the
health of fisheries and wildlife habitat downstream.”).
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As the push for transfer of public lands plays out at the state and
federal levels, several organizations have encouraged county governments
to pass ordinances or plans that invoke coordination with the federal
government. For example, the American Legislative Exchange Council
(“ALEC”), a group backed by the Charles and David Koch, 16 hosts a
website with model legislation including “An Ordinance for Local
Coordination on Federal Regulations.” 17 The American Stewards of
Liberty (“American Stewards”), is a Texas-based18 organization directed
by the daughter of late Nevada rancher, Wayne Hage. 19 The group
provides guidance on coordination including in-person courses on the
coordination process 20 and free lessons on how county commissioners
might use coordination to incorporate their demands into federal land
plans.21 Similarly, the Public Lands Council urges county governments to
invoke coordination, describing the process in its “Beginner’s Guide to
Coordination” as “a negotiation on a government-to-government basis that
seeks to ensure officially approved local plans and policies are
accommodated by planning and management decisions on federal
lands.” 22 These groups encourage county commissioners to adopt
statutory interpretations of their authority to influence federal land
management that have little basis in federal law.
16.
See Lisa Graves, ALEC Exposed: The Koch Connection, THE NATION
(July 12, 2011), https://www.thenation.com/article/alec-exposed-koch-connection/
(“Hundreds of ALEC’s model bills and resolutions bear traces of Koch DNA: raw
ideas that were once at the fringes but that have been carved into ‘mainstream’ policy
through the wealth and will of Charles and David Koch.”); Nancy Scola, Exposing
ALEC: How Conservative-Backed State Laws Are All Connected, THE ATLANTIC
(Apr. 14, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/ archive/2012/04/exposing-alechow-conservative-backed-state-laws-are-all-connected/255869/.
17.
American Legislative Exchange Council, An Ordinance for Local
Coordination on Federal Regulations, ALEC.ORG, https://www.alec.org/modelpolicy/an-ordinance-for-local-coordination-on-federal-regulations/ (last visited Sept.
24, 2016). One might reasonably suspect that ALEC hopes to make coordination
ordinances more common in effort to make coordination and transfer policies more
mainstream. See Scola, supra note 16 (“Adopted first in the states, by the time these
laws bubble up to the national level, they’re the conventional wisdom on policy.”).
18.
The federal government owns only 1.8% of the land in Texas. CAROL
VINCENT ET AL., FEDERAL LAND OWNERSHIP: OVERVIEW AND DATA (Congressional
Research Service 2014), available at https://www.fas.org/sgp/ crs/misc/R42346.pdf.
The fact that American Stewards of Liberty is based in Texas suggests the
organization’s hostility to the notion of any federal land ownership at all. American
Stewards
of
Liberty,
AMERICANSTEWARDS.US,
https://www.american
stewards.us/about/ (last visited Sept. 24, 2016).
19.
The Executive Director of American Stewards of Liberty, Margaret
Byfield, “became actively involved in the property rights movement after her parents,
Wayne and Jean Hage, filed Hage v. United States in the Federal Court of Claims—a
court battle that began in 1991 resulting in the most significant Fifth Amendment
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County governments asserting novel interpretations of their role
in federal land management face a steep uphill legal battle because the
Property Clause of the United States Constitution gives the federal
government plenary authority in managing its land.23 As long ago as 1840,
the Supreme Court of the United States declared that Congress’s power to
manage public lands under the Property Clause is “without limitation.”24
Numerous ensuing decisions consistently reaffirmed that federal land
agencies have enormous discretion in making federal land management
decisions.25
victory for property owners in the past two decades.” American Stewards of Liberty,
AMERICANSTEWARDS.US, https://www.americanstewards.us/ about/directors/ (last
visited Sept. 24, 2016). Indeed, the Court of Federal Claims ruled that the federal
government had taken Hage’s water rights on federal land without just compensation
in Estate of Hage v. United States. 82 Fed. Cl. 202, 211–13 (2008). However, the
Federal Circuit reversed that ruling in 2012. Estate of Hage v. United States, 687 F.3d
1281, 1287–91 (2012). Moreover, in related litigation the Ninth Circuit recently ruled
that the Hage family held no federal easement for their cattle to cross federal lands
and that their water rights do not include an appurtenant right to graze public lands.
United States v. Hage, 810 F.3d 712, 718–20 (9th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct.
332 (2016). The Ninth Circuit took the additional, extraordinary step of removing
federal district Judge Robert C. Jones from the Hage case due to his bias and prejudice
in favor of the Hage family. Id. at 723. On remand, the Nevada district court ordered
the Hage family to pay $587,294.28 for their illegal grazing, and “forever enjoined
and restrained” them from ever placing cattle on public lands in Nevada without
authorization. United States v. Hage, No. 2:07-cv-01154, 2017 WL 752832, at *7 (D.
Nev. Feb. 27, 2017), appeal filed, Mar. 9, 2017. These rulings quash the premise in
Wayne Hage’s book, where he argued that grazing permittees hold property interests
in the form of “range rights.” See generally WAYNE HAGE, STORM OVER
RANGELANDS: PRIVATE RIGHTS IN FEDERAL LANDS 1–23 (1994).
20.
American Stewards of Liberty, Training, AMERICANSTEWARDS.US,
https://www.americanstewards.us/programs/training/ (last visited Sept. 25, 2016).
21.
American Stewards of Liberty, Coordination, AMERICANSTEWARDS.
US, https://www.americanstewards.us/programs/coordination/ (last visited Sept. 25,
2016).
22.
ANDREA RIEBER, A BEGINNER’S GUIDE TO COORDINATION 5 (Public
Lands Council 2012).
23.
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
24.
United States v. Gratiot, 39 U.S. 526, 537 (1840).
25.
See, e.g., United States v. Gardner, 107 F.3d 1314, 1318 (1997) (“The
United States . . . was not required to hold the public lands in Nevada in trust for the
establishment of future states. Rather, under the Property Clause, the United States
can administer its federal lands any way it chooses.”); Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426
U.S. 529, 543 (1976) (“Absent consent or cession a State undoubtedly retains
jurisdiction over federal lands within its territory, but Congress equally surely retains
the power to enact legislation respecting those lands pursuant the Property Clause.”);
Hunt v. United States, 278 U.S. 96, 100 (1928) (federal government may kill wildlife
on public lands to reduce grazing pressure, notwithstanding state hunting laws to the
contrary); Utah Power & Light v. United States, 243 U.S. 389, 389–90 (1917) (“[T]he
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Historically, states and local governments rarely passed
coordination laws.26 But like targets in a “whack-a-mole” game, these
ordinances are now emerging across the West, with counties in Oregon,27
Washington,28 and Wyoming29 considering such legislation. For example,
the county board of commissioners in Baker County, Oregon adopted a
“Natural Resources Plan” in 2015, which attempts to require federal
agencies to coordinate with the county government on nearly every aspect
of public land use, including road closures, grazing permit changes,
wilderness area designations, fire suppression, and designation of national
monuments. 30 Other rural Oregon counties are in various stages of
enacting substantially similar coordination ordinances.31 Many of these
ordinances share the presumption that federal agencies must maximize
resource production on federal land to stimulate local economies and value

inclusion within a state of lands of the United States does not take from Congress the
power to control their occupancy and use, to protect them from trespass and injury,
and to prescribe the conditions upon which others may obtain rights in them, even
though this may involve the exercise in some measure of what commonly is known as
the police power.”); Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523, 536 (1911) (“The United
States can prohibit absolutely or fix the terms on which its property may be used.”);
Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518, 524–26 (1897) (the federal government may
act as both a proprietor and a sovereign in protecting its property).
26.
See, e.g., S. 117, 62nd Leg. (Mont. 2011) (statute that would have
required local governments to demand coordination from federal agencies before
agencies implemented federal plans within county boundaries).
27.
See Peacher, supra note 5.
28.
See Pend Oreille County, Natural Resources Committee,
PENDOREILLECO.ORG, http://pendoreilleco.org/your-government/community-develop
ment/natural-resource-committee/#tab-id-1 (last visited May 4, 2017) (website
hosting meeting minutes and draft documents for advisory group working on
coordination ordinance).
29.
See Karla Pomeroy, County Advances Natural Resources Plan,
GREYBULL STANDARD (Mar. 12, 2015), http://smalltownnews.com/article.php?
catname=Local%20Government&pub=Greybull%20Standard&pid=13&aid=315504
(explaining that Big Horn County, Wyoming, is working with American Stewards of
Liberty on a coordination ordinance).
30.
BAKER COUNTY PLAN, supra note 9. See infra Part IV (discussing
the Baker County Plan).
31.
See Peacher, supra note 5. Crook and Grant Counties, Oregon, are
working on—but have yet to enact—coordination ordinances. See, e.g., Amanda
Peacher, Crook County Leaders Unexpectedly Table Natural Resources Plan,
OREGON PUBLIC BROADCASTING (July 20, 2016), http://www.opb.org/news/
article/crook-county-leaders-table-natural-resource-plan/; George Plaven, Grant
County Sheriff Demands Coordination With Forest Service, EAST OREGONIAN (Oct.
9, 2015), http://www.eastoregonian.com/eo/local-news/20151009/grant-countysheriff-demands-coordination-with-forest-service (Grant County commissioners
refused to adopt Natural Resources Plan drafted by deputized county residents).
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for local residents.32 The legal literature has yet to address the phenomena
of coordination ordinances and assess their validity. However, with the
beginning of President Donald J. Trump’s administration, these
ordinances could signal profound changes in public land management.
This Article explores the new wave of county coordination
ordinances and examines their consistency with congressional statutes,
agency regulations, and the Constitution’s Property and Supremacy
Clauses. Part II provides background on the Property Clause and the
tension between federal and local control of public lands. Part III explains
the statutory provisions in NFMA and FLPMA that counties rely on in
arguing the federal government must conform to local government
policies concerning land use decisions. Part IV explores the origins of the
coordination movement and explains the contents of a recent coordination
ordinance, the Baker County Natural Resources Plan. Part V discusses the
Supreme Court’s decision in Granite Rock and its legacy, 33 using the
Baker County plan as an illustrative coordination ordinance to evaluate
whether counties may impose their version of coordination on the federal
government. Part VI explains the role counties might play under current
law to work with the federal government in managing public lands, and
considers the uncertainties now posed by the Trump Administration. The
Article concludes that county governments have an important—and
perhaps underused—role in working collaboratively with federal agencies
to make responsible land management decisions. But local governments
seeking coordination must understand the limits of their authority and not
mislead their constituents by enacting natural resource plans that are
preempted by federal law.

32.
See, e.g., BAKER COUNTY PLAN, supra note 9, at 15–17 (requiring
federal land planners to evaluate economic effects of land planning to local economy,
and proposing federal payments to mitigate and compensate for management
decisions with detrimental effects to local economy).
33.
See California Coastal Comm’n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572,
581–82 (1987) (state may require environmental permit for mining on national
forests); see also S.D. Mining Ass’n v. Lawrence Cnty., 155 F.3d 1005, 1011 (8th Cir.
1998) (county environmental protection ordinance that effectively banned the only
profitable mining technique on federal land was preempted); Bohmker v. State, 172
F. Supp. 3d 1155, 1164–65 (D. Or. 2016) (state moratorium on motorized instreammining not preempted because law is a reasonable environmental regulation), appeal
docketed, No. 16-35262; People v. Rinehart, 377 P.3d 818, 829–30 (Cal. 2016) (state
may restrict certain mining techniques on public lands to protect other resources);
Boundary Backpackers v. Boundary Cnty., 913 P.2d 1141, 1143 (Idaho 1995) (county
cannot require federal government to comply with county land use plan).
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II. BACKGROUND: THE TENSION BETWEEN LOCAL AND
FEDERAL CONTROL
The federal government’s land management policies varied
widely over the past 200 years. In the nineteenth century, the federal
government purchased what is now the American West from Indian
tribes 34 and foreign governments. 35 Throughout the following century,
Congress enacted public land laws that largely facilitated disposal of these
lands from the public domain to private ownership.36 During this era, the
Supreme Court ruled that westerners had an implied license to use the
public lands as a grazing commons.37 Livestock owners used this implied
license to overgraze western public lands, resulting in reduced forage and
erosion that eventually contributed materially to the Dust Bowl in the
1920s and 1930s.38

34.
See Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 603–605 (1823) (establishing
that only the U.S. government may purchase land from Native Americans); see also
Felix S. Cohen, Original Indian Title, 32 MINN. L. REV. 28, 33–34 (1947) (“[E]xcept
for a few tracts of land in the Southwest, practically all of the public domain of the
continental United States (excluding Alaska) has been purchased from the Indians.”).
35.
In 1803, President Jefferson doubled the size of the United States
through the Louisiana Purchase, which included most land west of the Mississippi
River and the northern Rocky Mountains. See GEORGE C. COGGINS, CHARLES F.
WILKINSON, JOHN D. LESHY & ROBERT L. FISCHMAN, FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND
RESOURCES LAW 48 (7th ed. 2014). In 1845, the U.S. annexed Texas from Mexico.
See id. at 50. The following year, the U.S. and Great Britain entered the Oregon
Treaty, which added the Pacific Northwest to the federal government’s ownership.
See id. at 51. In 1848, as a result of the war with Mexico, Mexico granted the
American Southwest to the U.S. in the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. See id. The
United States purchased Alaska from Russia in 1867. See id.
36.
E.g., General Preemption Act of 1841, ch. 16, 5 Stat. 453 (granting
squatters on public land the option of purchasing the property from the federal
government); Graduation Act of 1854, ch. 244, 10 Stat. 574 (setting purchase prices
of public land per acre, with price discounts for undesirable lands); Homestead Act of
1862, ch. 75, 12 Stat. 392 (granting 160 acres of public land to settlers who improved
land and lived there five years); Pacific Railroad Act of 1862, ch. 120, 12 Stat. 489
(granting railroads ten square miles of public land for every mile of rail built); General
Mining Act of 1872, ch. 152, 17 Stat. 91 (establishing system for miners to acquire
patents to discoveries of valuable mineral deposits); Desert Land Act of 1877, ch. 107,
19 Stat. 377 (granting settlers 640 acres of public land for a small fee and proof of
irrigation); Stock-Raising Homestead Act of 1916, Pub. L. No. 290, 39 Stat. 862
(granting 640 acres of public land for grazing but reserving mineral estate to the U.S.).
37.
Buford v. Houtz, 133 U.S. 320, 326 (1890).
38.
See DEBRA L. DONAHUE, THE WESTERN RANGE REVISITED 33–36
(Gordon Bakken ed., 1999).
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In 1906, Gifford Pinchot’s regulations ended this grazing free-forall in national forests.39 On the high desert, free grazing ended in 1934,
when Congress passed the Taylor Grazing Act (“Taylor Act”). 40 The
Taylor Act placed virtually all unreserved federal western lands into
grazing districts 41 and established a permit and fee system for grazing
public lands.42 Congress and the Department of Interior granted existing
ranchers favorable terms: low fees, permission for established ranchers to
continue existing levels of grazing, and largely local control over range
management in the form of “grazing advisory councils.”43 Nevertheless,
the statute marked a major change in public lands policy by closing open
grazing commons on non-forest federal lands, helping end the homestead
era.44
In 1976, Congress expressly declared—in the first provision of
FLPMA— that it was “the policy of the United States that the public lands
be retained in Federal ownership, unless . . . disposal of a particular parcel
will serve the national interest.”45 Under the Taylor Act and FLPMA, the
amount of land under federal control remained fairly static for the past
eighty years, except for relatively small parcels that Congress bought, sold,

39.
In 1897, Congress granted the Secretary of Interior authority to make
rules and regulations for forest reserves. Surveying the Public Lands, ch. 2, § 300, 30
Stat. 32, 35. In 1905, Congress transferred this authority to the Department of
Agriculture. Pub. L. No. 34, 33 Stat. 628 (1905). Gifford Pinchot, the first Chief of
the Forest Service, proceeded to institute grazing regulations for federally-owned
forests in 1906. United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 509 (1911). The Supreme
Court upheld Pinchot’s authority to set grazing rules for national forests in 1911, id.
at 521–22; Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523, 536–37 (1911), thereby revoking the
public license to graze those areas the Court recognized in 1890. Buford, 133 U.S. at
326.
40.
Taylor Grazing Act, Pub. L. No. 73-482, 48 Stat. 1269 (1934)
(codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. § 315 (2012)); see George C. Coggins & Margaret
Lindbergh-Johnson, The Law of Public Rangeland Management II: The Commons and
the Taylor Act, 13 ENVTL. L. 1, 48 (1982) (“The major Taylor Act goals were
improvement of range condition and stabilization of the western livestock industry.”).
41.
43 U.S.C. § 315.
42.
Id. § 315(b) (requiring the Department of Interior to collect
“reasonable fees” and give preference in issuing permits to “those within or near a
district who are landowners engaged in the livestock business, bona fide occupants or
settlers, or owners of water or water rights”).
43.
See Coggins & Lindbergh-Johnson, supra note 40, at 60–63.
44.
See COGGINS ET AL., supra note 35, at 96 (“The [Taylor Grazing Act]
ushered in the end of the homesteading era. While President Franklin Roosevelt
closed most of the public domain to disposition by making sweeping executive
withdrawals in 1935 and 1936, homesteading remained possible, if barely so, until it
was officially ended in [FLPMA].”).
45.
43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(1) (2012).
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and exchanged with states and private parties. 46 In 2014, the federal
government owned 46.9% of the land in the eleven coterminous western
states, totaling 353 million acres.47
The Property Clause gives the federal government plenary
authority to act as both a proprietor and sovereign of its lands. 48 For
example, in Light v. United States, the Supreme Court ruled that its
Property Clause authority enables Congress to withdraw lands in federal
ownership from settlement without a state’s consent, and to regulate those
lands contrary to state law. 49 In United States v. Gettysburg Electric
Railway Co., the Court ruled that the Property Clause authorized federal
condemnation of lands for a national battlefield.50
The Property Clause power extends extra-territorially beyond the
bounds of public lands, allowing the federal government to extinguish fires
on private lands that threaten public lands 51 and to protect wildlife on
federal lands contrary to state law. 52 In United States v. Gratiot, the
Supreme Court rejected the argument that the term “dispose” in the
Property Clause gave the federal government only the authority to convey
its land by sale, upholding leasing of lead mines. 53 Recognizing

46.
Between the years 1781 and 2013, the federal government transferred
816 million acres of federal land to private ownership. See VINCENT, supra note 18,
at 2 (explaining that 97% of these transfers were before 1940).
47.
See id. at 20. The eleven contiguous western states are Arizona,
California, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah,
Washington, and Wyoming.
48.
The federal government may act as proprietor by bringing trespass or
nuisance claims, giving permission to use public lands, or by selling use-rights on
federal land. Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518, 524 (1897). The government
may act as a sovereign by, for example, prohibiting actions on private parcels
adjoining federal lands that would frustrate the federal government’s intentions for
uses of public land. See id. at 525–26 (“The general government doubtless has a power
over its own property analogous to the police power of the several states, and the
extent to which it may go in the exercise of such power is measured by the exigencies
of the particular case. If it be found to be necessary, for the protection of the public
or of intending settlers, to forbid all inclosures of public lands, the government may
do so.”).
49.
220 U.S. 523, 536–37 (1911).
50.
160 U.S. 668, 683 (1896).
51.
United States v. Alford, 274 U.S. 264, 267 (1927) (“Congress may
prohibit the doing of acts upon privately owned lands that imperil the publicly owned
forests.”) (Holmes, J.).
52.
Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 546 (1976).
53.
39 U.S. 526, 537–38 (1840).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2920355

2017

PUBLIC LAND & RESOURCES LAW REVIEW

14

Congress’s discretion in managing federal lands, the Court ruled that
“disposal” does not mean “selling.”54
The Supreme Court has invariably upheld Congress’s authority
under the Property Clause.55 Yet, westerners have periodically challenged
federal authority to own public land. In the 1970s and 1980s, advocates
for state ownership of western public lands mounted the Sagebrush
Rebellion. 56
The rebels unsuccessfully challenged the federal
government’s discretion to withhold public land from sale in Nevada ex
rel. Nevada State Board of Agriculture v. United States.57 On the basis of
the plenary congressional authority to manage public lands, the federal
district court dismissed the action for failure to state a claim,58 and the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit expressly rejected the
54.
Id. at 538–39 (“[T]he words ‘dispose of,’ cannot receive the
construction contended for at the bar; that they vest in Congress the power only to sell,
and not to lease such lands. The disposal must be left to the discretion of Congress.”).
55.
See California Coastal Comm’n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572,
580 (1987) (“This Court has ‘repeatedly observed’ that ‘[t]he power over the public
land thus entrusted to Congress is without limitations.’”); Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 539
(“[W]e have repeatedly observed that ‘[t]he power over the public land thus entrusted
to Congress is without limitations.’”); Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S.
275, 294–95 (1958) (same); Alabama v. Texas, 347 U.S. 272, 273 (1954) (“The power
of Congress to dispose of any kind of property belonging to the United States ‘is vested
in Congress without limitation.’”); Fed. Power Comm’n v. Idaho Power Co., 344 U.S.
17, 21 (1952) (“The power of Congress over public lands, conferred by [the Property
Clause], is ‘without limitations.’”); United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 27 (1947)
(“We have said that the [Property Clause] is without limitation.”); United States v.
San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16, 29 (1940) (“The power over the public land thus entrusted
to Congress is without limitations.”); Gibson v. Chouteau, 80 U.S. 92, 99 (1871)
(“With respect to the public domain, the Constitution vests in Congress the power of
disposition and of making all needful rules and regulations. That power is subject to
no limitations.”); Gratiot, 39 U.S. at 537 (“Congress has the same power over
[territories] as over any other property belonging to the United States; and this power
is vested in Congress without limitation.”); see also United States v. Gardner, 107
F.3d 1314, 1318 (9th Cir. 1997) (reviewing the history of Property Clause cases, and
concluding “under the Property Clause, the United States can administer its federal
lands any way it chooses”).
56.
See Bruce Babbitt, Federalism and the Environment: An
Intergovernmental Perspective of the Sagebrush Rebellion, 12 ENVTL. L. 847, 848
(1982) (“The management of public lands and natural resources in the West has been
the subject of growing controversy. While many issues are at stake, the battle has
coalesced around the movement known as the Sagebrush Rebellion. The rebels offer
a simple proposition: title to the vast public domain in the twelve western states should
be deeded to the states—lock, stock, and barrel.”).
57.
512 F. Supp. 166, 168 (D. Nev. 1981), aff’d, 699 F.2d 486, 487 (9th
Cir. 1983) (affirming dismissal of Nevada’s case on mootness grounds because the
Department of Interior rescinded its moratorium on land disposal).
58.
Id. at 172.
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rebellion’s constitutional argument that states are entitled to ownership of
public lands.59
In the early 1990s, the Sagebrush Rebellion reformulated as the
County Supremacy movement, and more than thirty western counties
enacted ordinances asserting authority over federal lands.60 For example,
in 1994, county commissioners in Nye County, Nevada, adopted
resolutions declaring that Nevada owned all public lands within its state
boundary and claiming county ownership of all “travel corridors” across
public lands in Nye County. 61 After a county commissioner began
bulldozing roads on federal lands, the federal government filed suit against
the county.62 In United States v. Nye County, Nevada, a federal district
court declared the federal government had sufficient authority to own and
manage public lands within Nye County, and that federal law preempted
county resolutions claiming new county rights-of-way across federal
land.63

59.
Gardner, 107 F.3d at 1318–20 (holding that: (1) the Property Clause
allows the federal government to own land and establish forest reserves within states;
(2) the equal footing doctrine does not require the federal government to give Nevada
title to public lands; and (3) federal land holdings within Nevada’s borders are
consistent with the Nevada Statehood Act and the Tenth Amendment).
60.
See OSENBAUGH & STONER, supra note 2, at 498. Counties do not
have federal constitutional status because the United States Constitution is only about
federal versus state relations. See U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated
to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved
to the States respectively, or to the people.”).
61.
United States v. Nye Cnty, Nev., 920 F. Supp. 1108, 1111 (D. Nev.
1996).
62.
Id. at 1111–12.
63.
Id. at 1120; see also Robert Glicksman, Fear and Loathing on the
Federal Lands, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 647, 659 (1996) (“Nye County and Gardner
remove whatever slim doubts may have remained about the legality of federal land
ownership in the western states. These two cases confirm the obvious: claims that the
federal land management agencies are powerless to own and manage activities on the
lands under their jurisdiction are ‘legally frivolous.’ More broadly, as one
commentator aptly remarked, ‘the county supremacy ordinances have the durability
of cow chips.’”).
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Self-styled “constitutionalists,” including Ammon Bundy and the
Malheur occupiers, 64 state politicians, 65 and county elected officials 66
continue to challenge the federal government’s authority to own and
manage public lands. But reversing 200 years of Property Clause
jurisprudence would require an unlikely rejection of bedrock principles in

64.
See Tay Wiles & Nathan Thompson, Who’s Who Inside and On the
Outskirts of the Malheur Occupation, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS (Jan. 11, 2016),
http://www.hcn.org/articles/whos-who-at-the-oregon-standoff-malhuer-bundy (“The
occupiers, led by Ammon Bundy, have demanded that the federal government hand
over the refuge to the citizens of Harney County . . . . Many of Bundy’s fellow
occupiers at Malheur are members of militia groups who are new to the [Sagebrush
Rebellion arguments], but who share a constitutionalist, right-wing ideology.”).
65.
See Jack Healy & Kirk Johnson, The Larger, But Quieter Than
Bundy, Push to Take Over Federal Land, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Jan. 10, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/11/us/the-larger-but-quieter-than-bundy-push-totake-over-federal-land.html (“Ken Ivory, a Republican state representative from Utah,
has been roaming the West with an alluring pitch to cattle ranchers, farmers and
conservatives upset with how Washington controls the wide-open public spaces out
here: This land is your land, he says, and not the federal government’s.”); Joshua
Zaffos, New Leader Steps Up for the American Lands Council, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS
(Feb 10, 2016), http://www.hcn.org/articles/new-leader-steps-up-for-the-americanlands-council (noting that Montana state senator Jennifer Fielder would take Ken
Ivory’s place as CEO of the American Lands Council, and explaining “Fielder is vice
chair of the Montana Republican Party and has served as a board member of the
Sanders Natural Resources Council, a county natural resources advisory committee
that has backed county ‘coordination’ and local authority over federal lands. John
Trochmann, founder of the anti-government Militia of Montana, which has ties to
white-supremacist groups, started the council in 2006, according to a 2012 Montana
Human Rights Network report. Fielder also has connections with the Oath Keepers, a
constitutionalist militia group.”).
66.
See Les Zaitz, Grant County Sheriff, Deputy Botched Arrest in
‘Egregious Abuse of Power,’ THE OREGONIAN (June 12, 2016),
http://www.oregonlive.com/pacific-northwest-news/index.ssf/2016/06/egregious_
abuse_seen_in_grant.html (“[Grant County, Oregon, Sheriff Glenn Palmer] gained
national notice earlier this year for his sympathy for militants who took over the
Malheur National Wildlife Refuge. He considers himself a ‘constitutional sheriff’ and
vows to protect citizens from abusive government.”).
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American government, including judicial review 67 and the doctrine of
implied powers.68
III. STATUTORY AND REGULATORY CONTEXT: NFMA AND
FLPMA
The federal agencies managing much of the western public
lands—the United States Forest Service (“Forest Service”) and Bureau of
Land Management (“BLM”)—operate under different statutory mandates,

67.
See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically
the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. Those who
apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule.”).
On the other hand, self-proclaimed constitutional educator and talk show personality
KrisAnne Hall—quite popular among the Bundy crowd—claims judicial review is
unconstitutional:
The Bureau of Land Management, the federal government,
controlling our land, is a law that is lawless. It is outside the
Constitution. Do not tell me ‘the Supreme Court said this or that’
because the Supreme Court does not have the constitutional
authority to expand the power of the federal government or create
new powers. That is not the role of the Supreme Court. They don’t
even have the authority to be the ultimate arbiters of the
Constitution. James Madison—the father of the Constitution—
tells us in 1798 as he’s arguing before the ratification of the
Constitution, ‘Hey, the Supreme Court of the United States is not
above the states. The Supreme Court of the United States cannot
make law. The Supreme Court of the United States is not the
ultimate arbiter of the Constitution.’ James Madison so very
clearly explains that the ultimate arbiters of the Constitution are the
states themselves. They are the creators of the contract, they are
the drafters of the contract, they are the ones who actually ratified
the contract creating the federal government. The states are the
creators of the federal government, they are the controllers of the
federal government. It is time for us to understand the proper role
and function of our government. Do not tell me ‘Marbury v.
Madison.’ That is circular logic. The Supreme Court cannot create
an opinion that expands its own power.
KrisAnne Hall, What’s Really Going On in Oregon! Taking Back the Narrative! 3:52–
5:23 (KrisAnne Hall YouTube Channel, Jan. 5, 2016), https://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=T424sWq1SkE.
68.
See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 423 (1819) (“[W]here the
law is not prohibited, and is really calculated to effect any of the objects intrusted to
the government, to undertake here to inquire into the decree of its necessity, would be
to pass the line which circumscribes the judicial department, and to tread on legislative
ground. This court disclaims all pretensions to such a power.”).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2920355

2017

PUBLIC LAND & RESOURCES LAW REVIEW

18

which include “coordination” requirements. 69 The Forest Service
generally manages mountainous forestlands, while BLM administers
largely arid rangelands. 70 Both agencies manage federal land within
counties that have enacted coordination ordinances.71 This Part considers
the Forest Service and BLM statutes and regulations that counties rely on
to invoke coordination rights.72
The Forest Service’s chief governing statute, NFMA,73 requires
all management actions on national forest lands to be consistent with the
applicable Forest Service land and resource management plan.74 NFMA
also requires the agency to “develop, maintain, and, as appropriate, revise
land and resource management plans for units of the National Forest
System, coordinated with the land and resource management planning
processes of State and local governments and other Federal agencies.”75
Although NFMA does not define the term “coordinated,” the Forest
Service’s regulations interpret the coordination language to require that in
developing or revising plans, the agency must “review the planning and
land use policies” of local governments and disclose the results of that
69.
Most of the country’s public lands are managed by five federal
agencies: the U.S. Forest Service, the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), the U.S.
Fish and Wildlife Service, the National Park Service, and the Department of Defense.
VINCENT, supra note 18, at 1, 6. The Forest Service and BLM manage a large majority
of western public lands. Id. at 6 (map).
70.
Id. at 8; COGGINS ET AL., supra note 35, at 25–26.
71.
See, e.g., BAKER COUNTY PLAN, supra note 9, at 4 (the Forest Service
manages 33% of the land in Baker County, and BLM manages 18.5%).
72.
The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service’s (FWS) management of the
National Wildlife Refuge System is governed by the National Wildlife Refuge
Administration Act, as amended by the National Wildlife Refuge System
Improvement Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-57, 111 Stat. 1252 (codified at 16 U.S.C.
§§ 668dd-ee (2012)). Unlike the Forest Service and BLM governing statutes
(described below), the FWS statutory mandate does not require the FWS to coordinate
with local governments. Instead, the Refuge System Improvement Act requires the
FWS only to “coordinate” with states in developing refuge conservation plans. 16
U.S.C. § 668dd(e)(3)(B). In managing the refuge system, the agency must “ensure
effective coordination, interaction, and cooperation with owners of land adjoining
refuges and the fish and wildlife agency of the States in which the units of the System
are located[.]” Id. § 668dd(a)(4)(E). The county coordination ordinances do not
address these provisions governing FWS land management.
73.
National Forest Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-588, 90
Stat. 2949. See also Forest Service Organic Administration Act of 1897, ch. 2 ch. 300,
30 Stat. 34, 36 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 473-478, 479-482, 551 (2012)).
74.
16 U.S.C. § 1604(i) (2012). See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Martin, 168 F.3d
1, 4–5 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding a Forest Service decision to issue a timber sale was
arbitrary and capricious where forest plan committed the agency to collect population
data on certain species before issuing timber sales, and the agency failed to do so).
75.
16 U.S.C. § 1604(a) (emphasis added).
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review in the agency’s analysis under the National Environmental Policy
Act (“NEPA”).76 The regulations make clear the section should not be
read “to indicate that the responsible official will . . . conform management
to meet non–Forest Service objectives or policies.”77 Neither NFMA nor
agency regulations require the Forest Service to conduct land planning via
government-to-government consultation with counties.
FLPMA is BLM’s statutory mandate for public land
management. 78 Like NFMA, FLPMA requires BLM to develop and
maintain land use plans.79 FLPMA directs the Secretary of Interior “to the
extent consistent with the laws governing the administration of the public
lands, coordinate the land use inventory, planning, and management
activities . . . with the land use planning and management programs . . . of
the States and local governments within which the lands are located.”80
FLPMA grants BLM considerable discretion in coordinating with local
governments, requiring the Secretary’s land use plans only to “be
consistent with State and local plans to the maximum extent he finds
76.
36 C.F.R. § 219.4(b)(2) (2017). The review must consider local
government objectives, the “compatibility” of planning documents, and “opportunities
for the plan to address the impacts defined or to contribute to joint objectives,” as well
as “opportunities to resolve or reduce conflicts.” Id. § 219.4(b)(2)(i)–(iv). The Forest
Service’s 1982 planning regulations included the same requirement that the agency
“review the planning and land use policies” of local governments and disclose those
results in the agency’s NEPA analysis. See id. § 219.7(c).
77.
Id. § 219.4(b)(3).
78.
Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94576, 90 Stat. 2728.
79.
43 U.S.C. § 1712(a) (2012).
80.
Id. § 1712(c)(9) (emphasis added). The statute continues:
In implementing this directive, the Secretary shall, to the extent he
finds practical, keep apprised of State, local, and tribal land use
plans; assure that consideration is given to those State, local, and
tribal plans that are germane in the development of land use plans
for public lands; assist in resolving, to the extent practical,
inconsistencies between Federal and non-Federal Government
plans, and shall provide for meaningful public involvement of State
and local government officials, both elected and appointed, in the
development of land use programs, land use regulations, and land
use decisions for public lands, including early public notice of
proposed decisions which may have a significant impact on nonFederal lands. Such officials in each State are authorized to furnish
advice to the Secretary with respect to the development and
revision of land use plans, land use guidelines, land use rules, and
land use regulations for the public lands within such State and with
respect to such other land use matters as may be referred to them
by him.
Id. (emphasis added).
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consistent with Federal law and the purposes of this Act.” 81 BLM
regulations in effect through December 2016 interpreted the objectives of
coordination to include considering and “keep[ing] apprised” of local
plans, 82 “resolving, to the extent practicable, inconsistencies between
Federal and non-Federal government plans,”83 and providing “meaningful
public involvement” to local government officials.84 In December 2016,
BLM promulgated its “Planning 2.0” process, revising portions of the
FLPMA regulations, but those regulations were rescinded in March 2017
under the terms of the Congressional Review Act.85 Like FLPMA, both
81.
Id. Professor Coggins expounded on FLPMA’s coordination
provision in a 1983 law review article, calling it “as curious as it is lengthy.” See
George C. Coggins, The Law of Public Rangeland Management IV: FLPMA, PRIA,
and the Multiple Use Mandate, 14 ENVTL. L. 1, 96 (1983) (“[43 U.S.C. § 1712(c)(9)]
is as curious as it is lengthy. Congress basically required the Secretary to coordinate
planning with every other governmental entity in the area and to try to make the federal
land use plan compatible with state or local plans. The section also makes clear that
the federal plan is dominant; the Secretary need not fully comply with local
requirements. Unlike the other subsections of section 1712(c), this provision is
peppered with ‘to-the-extent-thats.’ The Secretary can disregard local advice if
impractical or inconsistent with federal law or purposes. Section 1712(f) requires even
broader public participation, ‘including public hearings where appropriate.’”).
82.
43 C.F.R. § 1610.3–1(a)(1), (2) (2016). BLM revised these
regulations in 2016, see below note 85, but the new rule maintained this language. 43
C.F.R. § 1610.3–2(a)(1), (2) (2017).
83.
43 C.F.R. § 1610.3–1(a)(3) (2016). BLM revised these regulations
in 2016, see below note 85, but the new rule maintained similar language. 43 C.F.R.
§ 1610.3–2(a)(3) (2017) (replacing “practicable” in the regulation with “practical”).
84.
Id. § 1610.3–2(a)(4). BLM revised these regulations in 2016, see
infra note 85, but the new rule maintained this language. 43 C.F.R. § 1610.3–2(a)(4)
(2017).
85.
On March 27, 2017, President Trump signed a resolution rescinding
the Planning 2.0 regulations. See Pub. Law. No. 115-12, H.J. Res. 44 (March 27,
2017) (nullifying the Planning 2.0 FLPMA regulations). Nevertheless, we provide a
discussion of the Planning 2.0 changes here because we believe the 2017 regulations
required substantially similar coordination and consistency obligations as the previous
rules, and did not provide any new deference or planning authority to local
governments.
The “Planning 2.0” regulations altered the language of 43 C.F.R. § 1610.3–
1 and 1610.3–2, and added a provision at 43 C.F.R. § 1610.3–3. 81 Fed. Reg. 89,580,
89,614–22 (Dec. 12, 2016). Under the previous rule, § 1610.3–1 addressed
coordination of planning efforts, and § 1610.3–2 addressed consistency requirements
between federal and non-federal plans. The “Planning 2.0” regulations inserted a new
provision at § 1610.3–1 titled “Consultation with Indian Tribes,” and the
“Coordination of Planning Efforts” and “Consistency Requirements” provisions were
redesignated, respectively, as § 1610.3–2, and § 1610.3–3. 81 Fed. Reg. at 89,614–
22.
The Planning 2.0 regulations concerning coordination and consistency
between federal and local plans would not have differed significantly from the
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versions of the regulations acknowledge the agency’s broad discretion in
reaching consistency with local plans. 86 FLPMA and its regulations

previous, 2016 version. See id. at 89,614–22 (explaining the differences between 2016
FLPMA regulations at 43 C.F.R. § 1610.3 and the new Planning 2.0 regulations). The
Planning 2.0 “Coordination of Planning Efforts” regulation included a new sentence
stating that BLM is to coordinate with state and local governments “to the extent
consistent with federal laws and regulations applicable to public lands.” Compare 43
C.F.R. § 1610.3–1(a) (2016) (“In addition to the public involvement prescribed by §
1610.2, the following coordination is to be accomplished with other Federal agencies,
state and local governments, and federally recognized Indian tribes.”), with 43 C.F.R.
§ 1610.3–2(a) (2017) (“In addition to the public involvement prescribed by § 1610.2,
and to the extent consistent with Federal laws and regulations applicable to public
lands, coordination is to be accomplished with other Federal agencies, State and local
governments, and Indian tribes.”) (emphasis added). BLM explained this revision in
the Federal Register as a clarification of the meaning of coordination in FLPMA, not
a change in policy. See 81 Fed. Reg. at 89,615 (“Final § 1610.3–2(a) does not
represent a change from current practice or policy.”); 81 Fed. Reg. 9,674, 9,702 (Feb.
25, 2016) (“[The new language in 43 C.F.R. § 1610.3–2(a)] would be no change from
current practice or policy. The BLM only wishes to clarify that BLM must comply
with Federal laws and regulations.”).
The Planning 2.0 regulations clearly outlined “coordination requirements,”
requiring only that BLM provide local governments “opportunity for review, advice,
and suggestions on issues and topics which may affect or influence other agency or
other government programs.” 43 C.F.R. § 1610.3–2(c) (2017). Under this regulation,
local governments were entitled to notice of proposed changes to BLM plans where
the local government has requested such notice or where the BLM has reason to
believe the local government would be interested in opportunities for public
involvement. Id. § 1610.3–2(c)(3); see also id. § 1610.3–2(c)(5) (requiring BLM to
provide 30 days notice to local governments of opportunities for review and comment
on land planning).
86.
FLPMA regulations require consistency with local plans only “so
long as the . . . resource management plans are also consistent with the purposes,
policies and programs of Federal laws and regulations applicable to public lands.” 43
C.F.R. 1610.3–2(a) (2016).
The Planning 2.0 version of the “Consistency Requirements” regulation was
quite similar to the 2016 version of the regulation. 43 C.F.R. § 1610.3–3(a) (2017)
(“Resource management plans shall be consistent with officially approved and
adopted plans of other Federal agencies, State and local governments, and Indian
tribes to the maximum extent the BLM finds consistent with the purposes of FLPMA
and other Federal laws and regulations applicable to public lands, and the purposes,
policies and programs implementing such laws and regulations.”) (emphasis added);
see also 81 Fed. Reg. at 89,618–22 (explaining the differences between the 2016
consistency regulations and the new Planning 2.0 version).
BLM received comments during the Planning 2.0 process objecting to the
requirement in 43 C.F.R. 1610.3–2(a) (2016) that BLM plans be consistent with local
plans only so long as those plans were consistent with the purposes and requirements
of federal law and regulation, see 81 Fed. Reg. at 89,618, but the new Planning 2.0
consistency regulations maintained this requirement in slightly different language.
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require BLM to listen to local sentiments on public land management but
do not require the agency to ensure compatibility with local government
resource plans.87
No federal court has interpreted the “coordination” provisions in
either NFMA or FLPMA. Under the deferential judicial review of the
Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 (“APA”), 88 federal courts will
likely uphold reasonable agency regulatory interpretations of
“coordination.” 89 Counties lack authority to interpret the coordination
See 43 C.F.R. § 1610.3–3(a) (2017) (quoted above). BLM explained its decision not
to require more consistency between BLM and local plans:
The BLM received public comments in opposition to [43 C.F.R. §
1610.3–2(a) (2016)], noting that under FLPMA the obligation for
consistency with local plans does not hinge on whether or not they
are consistent with Federal purposes, policies and programs, only
whether they do not contradict Federal Laws. The BLM disagrees
with these comments. The BLM does not interpret FLPMA to
require resource management plans to be consistent with the
described non-BLM plans if those plans are simply lawful under
Federal law and FLPMA. Rather, and particularly given
1712(c)(9)'s explicit reference to the purposes of FLPMA, and
BLM's and the Secretary's ultimate responsibility as the manager
of the public lands, BLM interprets FLPMA to authorize it to
evaluate whether those non-BLM plans are consistent with the
policies underlying BLM management of the public lands.
81 Fed. Reg. at 89,618–19.
87.
BLM’s “Desk Guide to Coordination” addresses situations where
local plans are inconsistent with federal law and policy, explaining:
In such cases, the BLM does not have an obligation to seek
consistency. For example, in preparing [resource management
plans] the BLM is required to designate and protect areas of
critical environmental concern (ACECs). The BLM could not
honor a request from a county government that only ACECs
consistent with the county’s general plan be designated in the
[resource management plan], if this would prevent the BLM from
complying with its statutory obligation.
BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, A DESK GUIDE TO COOPERATING AGENCY
RELATIONSHIPS AND COORDINATION WITH INTERGOVERNMENTAL PARTNERS 33
(2012).
88.
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012).
89.
See Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
842–43 (1984).
When a court reviews an agency's construction of the statute which
it administers, it is confronted with two questions. First, always, is
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provisions in NFMA or FLPMA to create binding obligations on federal
agencies.90 NFMA and FLPMA require the Forest Service and BLM to
consider the views of and attempt to collaborate with local governments
in agency planning. But neither the statutes nor agency regulations require
the Forest Service or BLM to conduct government-to-government
consultation with county governments on public land management.

the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise
question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end
of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect
to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however,
the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the
precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own
construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence
of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or
ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the
court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible
construction of the statute.
Id.
90.
As one attorney advised after reviewing a coordination bill in
Montana, when “a reviewing court reviews [an agency] management decision, it will
look to see whether the [agency] complied with its own authorizing statutes and
regulations, not whether it complied with a unilaterally enacted county interpretation.”
Memorandum from Kenneth P. Pitt, Attorney, to Travis McAdam, Dir., Montana
Human
Rights
Network
(June
26,
2012),
available
at
http://www.mhrn.org/publications/fact%20sheets%20and%20adivsories/Final%20Le
gal%20Memo%20on%20Coordination.pdf.
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IV. THE COORDINATION ORDINANCES
Some western counties have approved coordination ordinances,91
while other counties are in various stages of preparing their own plans.92
91.
See, e.g., BAKER COUNTY PLAN, supra note 9, at 10 (“Baker County
expects . . . federal agencies to engage in coordination with the County, upon the
County’s request, for land use planning efforts and on an ongoing basis—as mandated
by applicable statute, regulations, policy, and case law.”); KANE CNTY., UTAH,
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT PLAN 7 (Mar. 23, 2015) [hereinafter KANE COUNTY PLAN]
(“Federal land management planning processes shall include Kane County as an
active, coordinating, on-going partner, consistent with federal mandates involving
coordination. Federal land management plans shall be consistent with county goals
and policies[.]”); RAVALLI CNTY., MONT., RESOLUTION NO. 2978 1 (Nov. 21, 2012)
[hereinafter RAVALLI COUNTY RESOLUTION] (“It is the policy of Ravalli County to
invoke coordination with any and all appropriate agencies at the beginning of the
scoping process and throughout the process for all areas of natural resource
management and use.”); MONTEZUMA CNTY., COLO., RESOLUTION #08-2010 2 (Aug.
30, 2010) (Board of County Commissioners “calls upon all federal agencies and state
agencies linked with them in implementing plans, projects, policies, and management
actions in Montezuma County to coordinate with the Board of County Commissioners
or their designee as they are required to do by federal laws[.]”); HARNEY CNTY., OR.,
COMPREHENSIVE PLAN 29 (Nov. 2009) (“Harney County will keep an open line of
communication with all government entities and Non Government Organizations
(NGO’s) to exchange ideas, views and plans with the intent that these bodies will
attempt to coordinate with and abide by the Harney County Comprehensive Plan.”);
MALHEUR CNTY., OR., MALHEUR COUNTY PLAN, 2-4-3 (Dec. 5, 2001) [hereinafter
MALHEUR COUNTY PLAN] (requiring federal agencies to “[c]oordinate procedures to
the fullest extent possible with the county, on an equal basis and not with the county
as subordinate, prior to and during the taking of any federal . . . action”); WAYNE
CNTY., UTAH, RESOURCE MANAGEMENT PLAN 1 (“Wayne County asserts planning
authority over all lands and natural resources within its geographical boundaries even
though the United States owns the vast majority of those lands and resources. Like
any other landowner in the County, the United States is subject to Wayne County’s
land and natural resource plans and policies to the maximum extent, provided such
plans and policies of Wayne County are consistent with federal law.”).
92.
See BIG HORN CNTY., WYO., [DRAFT] NATURAL RESOURCE
MANAGEMENT PLAN FOR STATE AND FEDERAL LANDS A-4 (Sept. 10, 2016)
[hereinafter BIG HORN COUNTY PLAN] (“Coordination recognizes that the
responsibilities of local governments are ‘equal, not subordinate’ to the duties of
federal and state governments, and that the needs of the local governments must be
incorporated into the federal and state planning processes. . . . The County recognizes
that federal law supersedes state and local law, and that it is federal law that requires
agencies to coordinate and reach consistency with Big Horn County plans and
policies.”); George Plaven, Grant County Sheriff Demands Coordination with Forest
Service, EAST OREGONIAN (Oct. 9, 2015), http://www.eastoregonian. com/eo/localnews/20151009/grant-county-sheriff-demands-coordination-with-forest-service
(Grant County, Oregon, commissioners refused to adopt Natural Resources Plan
drafted by deputized county residents); Amanda Peacher, Crook County Rejects
Controversial Natural Resources Plan, THE OREGONIAN (Aug. 30, 2016),
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This Part explains the origins of the coordination movement, then
discusses the contents of the Baker County, Oregon Natural Resources
Plan.
A. Origins of the Coordination Movement
For several years, the Public Lands Council 93 and American
Stewards94 have provided materials urging counties to enact coordination
ordinances. 95 Due to their influence, many of the county coordination
ordinances are quite similar. For example, the Baker County ordinance
duplicates the language (and the font) describing coordination in the
Public Lands Council’s 2012 “Beginner’s Guide to Coordination.”96 The
Grant County, Oregon, draft ordinance copied the text (and the font) of the
Baker County ordinance.97 But the most conspicuous similarity between

http://www.opb.org/news/article/crook-county-rejects-natural-resource-plan/ (Crook
County, Oregon, government voted against adopting current draft of coordination
ordinance after county attorney “said the submitted plan didn’t pass legal muster.”);
Pend Oreille County, Wash., Natural Resources Committee, supra note 28 (website
hosting meeting minutes and draft documents for advisory group working on
coordination ordinance).
93.
See RIEBER, supra note 22.
94.
See supra notes 18–21.
95.
See supra notes 17–22.
96.
Compare RIEBER, supra note 22, at 5 (“Coordination is a federally
mandated process that requires the BLM and Forest Service to work with local
governments to seek consistency between federal land use planning and local land use
plans and policies. Coordination requires federal agencies do more than just inform
local governments of their future management plans and decisions, and it requires that
they do more than merely solicit comment from local government entities.
Coordination calls for something beyond that: a negotiation on a government-togovernment basis that seeks to ensure officially approved local plans and policies are
accommodated by planning and management decisions on federal lands.”), with
BAKER COUNTY PLAN, supra note 9, at 10 (“Coordination is a federally mandated
process that requires all state and federal agencies including the BLM and Forest
Service to work with local governments to seek consistency between state and federal
land use planning and management and local land use plans and policies.
Coordination, by its plain meaning, requires state and federal agencies do more than
just inform local governments of their future management plans and decisions and it
requires that they do more than merely solicit comments from local government
entities. Coordination calls for something beyond that: a negotiation on a governmentto-government basis that seeks to ensure officially approved local plans and policies
are included in the public lands planning and management decisions of state and
federal agencies.”).
97.
See GRANT CNTY., OR., PUBLIC LANDS NATURAL RESOURCES PLAN
10 (Sept. 30, 2015), available at https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/
2852061-Natural-Resources-Plan.html [hereinafter GRANT COUNTY PLAN] (proposed
coordination ordinance quoting the BAKER COUNTY PLAN, supra note 9, verbatim).
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all coordination ordinances is their shared, flawed understanding of what
“coordination” means under federal law.
American Stewards is a major source of this misunderstanding. In
its materials urging county governments to seek coordination, American
Stewards relies on a plain meaning approach to define “coordination” in
NFMA and FLPMA. 98 Relying on dictionaries 99 and irrelevant court

98.
See American Stewards of Liberty, Coordination: A Strategy for
Local Control at *6–7, AMERICANSTEWARDS.US, https://www.americanstewards.us/
programs/coordination/coordination-overview/. (last visited May 4, 2017)
[hereinafter Coordination: A Strategy for Local Control] (construing “coordination”
in federal law by arguing “when a legislative body uses a word of common, everyday
usage without specific definition it is presumed that the legislative intent was to use
the word as it is commonly defined[,]” reviewing various dictionary and state court
definitions of “coordinate,” and concluding “[i]t is patently obvious that when a
legislature uses the word ‘coordinate’ or ‘coordination’ it means more than ‘cooperate’
or ‘consult’”); see also American Stewards of Liberty, Coordination Overview,
AMERICANSTEWARDS.US,
https://www.americanstewards.us/programs/
coordination/coordination-overview/ (last visited May 4, 2017) [hereinafter
Coordination Overview] (“Given the dictionary definition of the term and concept of
‘coordination’ and, given the actions which the agencies must take under FLPMA, it
is apparent that Congress intended to require equal base negotiations to reach
consistency.”).
99.
See Coordination Overview, supra note 98 (“The common dictionary
definition of ‘coordinate’ shows that a person or party operating in ‘coordinate’
fashion is operating as a party ‘of equal importance, rank or degree, not subordinate.’
(Webster’s New International Dictionary)[.] The American Heritage Dictionary
defines ‘coordinate’ as ‘one that is equal in importance, rank, or degree.’”);
Coordination: A Strategy for Local Control, supra note 98, at *6 (same); see also
REIBER, supra note 22, at 12 (“The fact that the Forest Service is directed to
‘coordinate’ with local governments implies by its plain meaning that the Forest
Service must engage in a process that involves more than simply ‘considering’ the
plans and policies of local governments.”).
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opinions100—eschewing the usual means of statutory interpretation101—
the group proclaims coordination means “government-to-government”102
consultation. American Stewards urges county governments to invoke this
aggressive interpretation of local authority by enacting coordination
ordinances.103
100. American Stewards’ materials cited two state court opinions—both
unrelated to federal land use planning—for the proposition that the plain meaning of
“coordinate” in NFMA and FLPMA is “government-to-government” consultation.
First, the American Stewards website cites California Native Plant Soc’y v. City of
Rancho Cordova, 91 Cal. Rptr. 3d 571 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009), for its construction of the
term “coordinate” in a city plan by relying on the Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate
Dictionary and New Oxford Dictionary. See Coordination Overview, supra note 98.
Ironically, the court ruled in California Native Plant Society that a city cannot
unilaterally approve a development project over the objections of the U.S. Fish &
Wildlife Service where the city’s general plan commits to “coordinating” mitigation
for threatened and endangered species with the federal agency. See California Native
Plant Soc’y, 91 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 641–43. Public Lands Council cites the same portions
of California Native Plant Society in its Beginners Guide to Coordination. See
RIEBER, supra note 22, at 12–13.
Second, American Stewards’ website and materials cite Empire Ins. Co. of
Tex. v. Cooper, 138 S.W.2d 159 (Tex. Civ. App 1940), for that court’s reliance on a
dictionary definition of “coordinate.” Coordination Overview, supra note 98;
Coordination: A Strategy for Local Control, supra note 98. In Empire Insurance, the
Texas state court decided the issue whether semicolons in a life insurance policy
separated equal or subordinate clauses. 138 S.W.2d at 163–64. The case was entirely
unrelated to federal land planning, but the court recited a definition of “semicolon”
from Webster’s Dictionary and Black’s Law Dictionary that included the word
“coordinate.” Id. at 163. The Texas court’s opinion included a definition for “coordinate,” id. at 163, which—according to American Stewards—demonstrates that
“coordination” in NFMA and FLPMA is subject to its plain meaning, dictionary
definition. See Coordination Overview, supra note 98.
American Stewards selectively cited the statutes and regulations in its
discussion of what coordination means under federal law. See id. (citing and
rephrasing FLPMA, then concluding “[g]iven the dictionary definition of the term and
concept of “coordination” and, given the actions which the agencies must take under
FLPMA, it is apparent that Congress intended to require equal base negotiations to
reach consistency”). However, the group’s materials neglect to mention language in
FLPMA and the NFMA regulations granting deference to the agency. See supra notes
77 (agency discretion in land planning under FLPMA), 81 (agency discretion in land
planning under NFMA).
101. See Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
842–43 (1984) (where statutory language is ambiguous, courts will defer to reasonable
agency regulations interpreting the statute).
102. See Coordination Overview, supra note 98 (“The statutes create a
process through which local government has an equal position at the negotiating table
with federal and state government agencies. They create a process which mandates
agencies to work with local government on a government-to-government basis.”).
103. See Coordination: A Strategy for Local Control, supra note 98, at *5
(“When Congress . . . orders agencies to coordinate their activities with local
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County commissioners may be unaware the coordination
American Stewards describes is inconsistent with federal law. American
Stewards sells annual subscriptions to counties for its advice and materials
on the coordination process, and county governments across the West pay
$1,500 fees to the group for these resources.104 Some counties have spent
more than $20,000 for the group’s materials.105 For example, Big Horn
government, they [sic] require the agencies to go to the negotiating table on an equal
footing with local government. The word ‘coordinate’ is a word of common usage, a
word of daily usage in general public communication. It is not a term of art or a term
of scientific and special meaning.”).
104. See Joshua Zaffos, Counties Use a ‘Coordination’ Clause to Fight
the Feds, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS (May 11, 2015), http://www.hcn.org/issues/47.8/
counties-use-a-coordination-clause-to-fight-the-feds (“Counties typically pay
American Stewards $1,500 for an initial daylong training, plus travel expenses.”); see,
e.g., Fee Agreement between Dan Byfield, American Stewards of Liberty, and J.R.
Iman, Ravalli Cnty. (Mont.) Comm’r (May 25, 2011) [hereinafter Fee Agreement]
(agreeing to pay $1,500 for American Steward’s services in drafting and editing
coordination ordinance, drafting or editing policy statements or letters, and preparing
county commissioners for coordination with federal government, with optional legal
services from American Stewards for $150/hour). When the Ravalli Republic
newspaper published a story about the county commissioner’s contract with American
Stewards, commenters to the online story expressed concern that American Stewards
is “an extreme right wing anti-government organization” and pointed to the group’s
“overtly religious” views. See Whitney Bermes, County Commission Signs Contract
with Coordination Consultants, RAVALLI REPUBLIC (Apr. 4, 2011), http://ravalli
republic.com/news/local/govt-and-politics/article_5d4005ac-5f33-11e0-8ffe-001cc4
c03286.html; see also American Stewards of Liberty, About Our Name,
AMERICANSTEWARDS.US https://www.americanstewards.us/about/our-name/ (last
visited May 4, 2017) (explaining the group’s name: “Through the divine hand of our
Creator, our founding fathers established a government and guarantee of personal
rights that give American citizens the ability to control our government . . .
Stewardship is a distinct concept with its roots in biblical principles where man was
given dominion over land and animals”). Voters in Garfield County, Colorado were
similarly concerned about the county working with American Stewards. See John
Stroud, Garfield County Contract with Property Rights Group Gets Criticism,
GLENWOOD SPRINGS POST INDEPENDENT (July 17, 2012), http://www.post
independent.com/news/garfield-county-contract-with-property-rights-group-getscriticism/ (noting local concerns about county contract with American Stewards
because of the group’s “ties to the oil and gas industry” and “alleged ties to the
corporate-backed conservative lobbying group American Legislative Exchange
Council (ALEC)”).
105. See Zaffos, supra note 104 (“Custer County, Idaho, had paid
American Stewards more than $23,000 as of August 2014, an HCN open-records
request revealed, and Garfield County, Colorado, has paid the group more than
$26,000 since 2012.”). In September 2016, commissioners in Garfield County,
Colorado, approved up to $40,000 for American Stewards’ services in opposing the
BLM’s Planning 2.0 process. See Garfield County, Garfield County Board of
Commissioners Meeting, GARFIELD-COUNTY.GRANICUS.COM (Sept. 6, 2016)
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County, Wyoming, used the group’s services106 to help formulate a draft
of the county’s coordination ordinance, which acknowledged that it “is the
latest draft of the [Plan] following a review and recommended
modifications provided by the American Stewards of Liberty, a consulting
firm hired by Big Horn County to assist with the development of draft
policy statements.”107 In 2011, American Stewards sent a memorandum
to county commissioners in Ravalli County, Montana, encouraging
enactment of a coordination ordinance to address wolf management
issues.108 The memorandum was drafted by then-president of American
Stewards, attorney Fred Kelly Grant, 109 whom Baker County
http://garfield-county.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?view_id=3&clip_id=1137
(video of county approving sole source contract with American Stewards of Liberty,
at 2:45:00). See supra note 85 (describing the BLM’s Planning 2.0 process).
106. See Pomeroy, supra note 29 (“One of the organizations [Big Horn
County] has used in developing the Natural Resource Plan is American Stewards of
Liberty (ASL).”).
107. BIG HORN COUNTY PLAN, supra note 92, at *1. In fact, American
Stewards is a 501(c)(3) non-profit, American Stewards of Liberty, About,
AMERICANSTEWARDS.US, https://www.americanstewards.us/about/ (last visited May
4, 2017), which we point out to correct the Big Horn County’s statement that the group
is a “consulting firm.” We do not address whether American Stewards might be
unlawfully acting as an action organization by influencing legislation. See I.R.C. §
501(c)(3) (2016) (requiring that organizations with tax-exempt status not attempt to
influence legislation as a substantial part of the group’s activities); see also Internal
Revenue
Service,
Lobbying,
IRS.GOV,
https://www.irs.gov/charities-nonprofits/lobbying (last visited May 4, 2017) (“An organization will be regarded as
attempting to influence legislation if it contacts, or urges the public to contact,
members or employees of a legislative body for the purpose of proposing, supporting,
or opposing legislation, or if the organization advocates the adoption or rejection of
legislation.”). American Stewards noted in its Fee Agreement with Ravalli County,
Mont., that “[w]e do not advocate any particular policy nor will we assist or get
involved in any local political issues or situations. We provide the education and the
tools by which you can either utilize them for your benefit or not.” Fee Agreement,
supra note 104, at 1.
108. Memorandum from Dan and Margaret Byfield, American Stewards
of Liberty, to Ravalli Cnty. Comm’rs (Feb. 9, 2011) (reviewing county
commissioner’s question “whether or not there was a way to resolve the negative
impact the endangered listing and management of the wolves” was having in Ravalli
County, and responding “of all counties impacted [by wolf recovery] across the west,
Ravalli may be in the best position to assert, through coordination, a management plan
that would be accepted.”).
109. Id. Fred Kelly Grant assisted the Hage/Byfield family in their longrunning grazing rights case, see supra note 19, against the federal government. Jason
Dearen ‘Sagebrush Rebellion’ Case Suffers Defeat, THE SEATTLE TIMES (Sept. 1,
2012), http://www.seattletimes.com/nation-world/sagebrush-rebellion-case-suffersdefeat/. Grant is a former president of American Stewards of Liberty, and he claims
responsibility for ALEC’s decision to provide model coordination legislation on their
website.
See Stand & Fight Club, About Fred Kelly Grant,
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commissioners placed on retainer several months before enacting the
Baker County coordination ordinance.110
American Stewards misled county commissioners by suggesting
commissioners have authority to require government-to-government
consultation under the coordination provisions of federal law. 111 By
heralding coordination as a potent—yet unrealized—brake on federal land
STANDANDFIGHTCLUB.COM,

http://www.standandfightclub.com/about-fred-kellygrant/ (last visited May 4, 2017). He is an outspoken conspiracy theorist on “Agenda
21,” arguing that a non-binding United Nations resolution to conserve natural
resources is actually an international plot against rural America. See Ryan Sabalow,
Controversial Lawyer Defends Property Rights, REDDING RECORD SEARCHLIGHT
(Jan. 23, 2012), http://www.redding.com/news/fred-kelly-grant-talks-agenda-21coordination-with-local-activists-ep-375305599-354531551.html; see also Leslie
Kaufman & Kate Zernike, Activists Fight Green Projects, Seeing U.N. Plot, THE NEW
YORK TIMES (Feb. 3, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/ 04/us/activists-fightgreen-projects-seeing-un-plot.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (“Across the country,
activists with ties to the Tea Party are railing against all sorts of local and state efforts
to control sprawl and conserve energy. [Agenda 21 activists] brand government action
for things like expanding public transportation routes and preserving open space as
part of a United Nations-led conspiracy to deny property rights and herd citizens
toward cities.”); Zaffos, supra note 104 (current executive director of American
Stewards of Liberty, Margaret Byfield, says she “learned the [coordination] strategy
from Fred Kelly Grant, the Hages’ litigation chairman, who was president of
American Stewards in 2006. Grant has promoted coordination in speeches to local
governments while railing against the United Nations’ Agenda 21, a sustainabledevelopment initiative some conservatives view as an international conspiracy against
private property rights.”).
110. Brian Addison, Baker County Working With Fred Kelly Grant to
Protect Local Lands, BAKER COUNTY PRESS (July 10, 2015), http://oregonnews.
uoregon.edu/lccn/2015260133/2015-07-10/ed-1/seq-3/; see also Aaron West,
Political Group Turns to Obscure Clause to Protect Land, BEND BULLETIN (Mar. 6,
2016), http://www.bendbulletin.com/localstate/4071793-151/political-group-turnsto-obscure-clause-to-protect (“According to Baker County Board of Commissioner
meeting documents, Grant came and spoke in 2010 and also assisted the county in
2015 with creating its local natural resource plan, which now serves as a model for the
Crook County [Oregon] Natural Resources PAC’s plan.”).
111. In addition to the American Stewards’ flawed legal analysis of what
“coordination” means in federal statutes, see supra notes 98–103, the group’s website
seems to declare coordination as the supreme law of the land. American Stewards of
Liberty, Coordination, the 4 “C’s”, and Supremacy, AMERICANSTEWARDS.US,
https://www.americanstewards.us/programs/coordination/ coordination-the-4-cs-andsupremacy/ (last visited May 4, 2017) (“Congress does have exclusive power over the
federal lands. In the exercise of that exclusive power, Congress has mandated that the
Bureau of Land Management and the Forest Service ‘coordinate’ their planning and
management processes with local government. The coordination mandate is found in
the Federal Land Policy Management Act and the National Forest Management Act.
Both are federal statutes passed in accordance with Congress’ constitutional power,
thus they are the supreme law of the land.”).
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management, American Stewards has lured western counties into
expending public funds for its services. County governments, in turn, are
responding by enacting ordinances grounded on a misinterpretation of
federal law.
B. Case Study: The Baker County Natural Resources Plan
The 2015 Baker County, Oregon, Natural Resources Plan is a
prime example of a coordination ordinance. The well-publicized plan112
was adopted by the county board of commissioners in September 2015 and
amended in July 2016.113 This Part explains the county’s position on a
variety of issues, including land planning, roads, grazing, logging, mining,
and special management area designations.
The county plan described the county’s “custom and culture,”
including a brief history of the Oregon Trail, the region’s reliance on the
mining and timber industries, and current county demographics.114 During
the County Supremacy movement,115 the National Federal Lands Council
assured westerners NEPA 116 required federal agencies to consider and
protect a county’s codified “custom and culture.” 117 Evidently, Baker
County continues to follow that advice, requiring in the plan that “[a]ny
proposed change in land use must evaluate, mitigate, and minimize
impacts to the customs and culture” of Baker County. 118 Other county
coordination ordinances begin with similar “custom and culture”

112. See, e.g., supra notes 5, 110.
113. BAKER COUNTY PLAN, supra note 9; BAKER COUNTY, OREGON,
NATURAL RESOURCES PLAN (September 24, 2015) (original version).
114. BAKER COUNTY PLAN, supra note 9, at 7–8.
115. See supra notes 60–63.
116. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83
Stat. 852 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4337 (2012)).
117. See Florence Williams, Sagebrush Rebellion II, HIGH COUNTRY
NEWS (Feb. 24, 1992), http://www.hcn.org/issues/24.3/sagebrush-rebellion-ii-somerural-countie-seek-to-influence-federal-land-use (quoting the drafter of “custom and
culture” ordinances, attorney Karen Budd, as explaining “NEPA . . . says the
government must use all practicable means to protect our national heritage . . . Most
people think of Indian bones and dinosaurs, but it could be just any use that’s occurred
over long periods of time. Wouldn’t five generations of ranching be a form of custom
and culture?”). The “national heritage” language in NEPA is in §101(b)(4) of the
statute. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b)(4) (“[I]t is the continuing responsibility of the Federal
Government to use all practicable means, consistent with other essential
considerations of national policy, to improve and coordinate Federal plans, functions,
programs, and resources to the end that the Nation may. . . preserve important historic,
cultural, and natural aspects of our national heritage.”).
118. BAKER COUNTY PLAN, supra note 9, at 15.
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sections. 119 These “custom and culture” provisions are vestiges of the
County Supremacy movement.120
The county plan announced its “requirements, needs, and
expectations of federal and state agencies with land-use planning and
decision-making powers within the boundaries of Baker County.” 121
These specifications included the county’s expectation that federal
agencies will coordinate with the county on “all agency planning efforts
and subsequent management decisions.”122 Moreover, the county required
federal agencies to use “on-the-ground monitoring and trend data (as
opposed to computer modeling and other remotely-collected data)” to
justify changes in federal land use planning.123 The county also “direct[ed]
that all decisions be based on current, relevant, peer reviewed science and
data[.]” 124 For federal agencies undertaking NEPA reviews in Baker
119. See, e.g., BIG HORN COUNTY PLAN, supra note 92, at A-14–15;
GRANT COUNTY PLAN, supra note 97, at 5–8; KANE COUNTY PLAN, supra note 91, at
1–4; MALHEUR COUNTY PLAN, supra note 91, at 2-4-4; Pend Oreille Plan, supra note
28, at 6–7; RAVALLI COUNTY RESOLUTION, supra note 91, at 6–7.
120. See Reed, supra note 2, at 550.
The ‘custom and culture’ theory teeters upon the slenderest of
reeds. The National Environmental Policy Act, relied upon by Ms.
Budd as authority, contains in some 350 words of the introductory
declaration of policy, the following as one of six broad general
policy directions: ‘(4) preserve important historic, cultural, and
natural aspects of our national heritage, and maintain, wherever
possible, an environment which supports diversity and variety of
individual choice.’ From this paragraph Ms. Budd has first
condensed to ‘historic, cultural, and natural aspects,’ then gone to
Webster's Dictionary to find that ‘culture’ is defined as including
‘customary beliefs’ and then gone to Bouvier's Law Dictionary
(1867 Edition!) to find a definition of ‘custom.’ The Budd
syllogism is to take ‘cultural’ out of context, alter the word to
‘culture,’ find an outdated dictionary that includes ‘customary’
within a definition of ‘culture’ and then transmute ‘customary’ to
‘custom.’ Voila! ‘Custom and Culture.’ The result is not statutory
construction but creative distortion.
Id.
121. BAKER COUNTY PLAN, supra note 9, at 9.
122. Id. at 11 (the plan stated “it is the express expectation of the County
that federal and state agencies will give the County early notification of forthcoming
decision-making and extend an early invitation to the County to participate in joint
planning and consultation.”).
123. Id. at 14 (the county demanded that “federal and state agencies shall
routinely solicit input and data from authoritative regional sources including Baker
County.”).
124. Id. at 2.
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County, the county plan required them to make “all practicable efforts . . .
to reconcile inconsistencies of proposed actions” with the county plan.125
No federal law, however, requires federal land planning to be consistent
with local planning.126
Roads are the first land use addressed in the county plan.127 The
plan required federal agencies to ensure “there will be no net loss” to
public land access in the county, and “[w]here there is no clear and
overriding reason to close a particular road, it shall remain open.” 128
Further, the county plan declared that “Revised Statute (RS) 2477 rightsof-way, will be enacted at appropriate areas.”129 The county plan required
that “roads accessing grazing allotments, water developments, mining
claims, foraging sites and other authorized land uses shall remain open.”130
These provisions suggest that the county has complete authority to
regulate travel routes across public lands.
The county plan addressed public lands grazing by proclaiming
that “grazing on federal and state allotments and leases shall continue at
historical stocking rates.”131 The plan dictated a three-part test, which it
claimed to impose on federal agencies before reducing grazing intensity
to address range health. 132 These provisions are almost certainly
125. Id. at 12 (where consistency is not possible, “Baker County expects
that the federal agency shall engage with the County in conflict resolution and work
with the County to mitigate any residual impacts to the County and its citizens.”).
126. See supra notes 77 (Forest Service regulations), 81, 86 (FLPMA
regulations).
127. BAKER COUNTY PLAN, supra note 9, at 18.
128. Id. at 18.
129. Id. R.S. 2477 is the common term for an 1866 law that gave a broad
grant of right-of-ways “for the construction of highways over public lands.’ Act of
July 26, 1866, ch. 262, § 8, 14 Stat. 251 (codified at R.S. 2477, recodified at 43 U.S.C.
§ 932 (2012)). FLPMA repealed the law in 1976, subject to “valid existing rights.”
Pub. L. No. 94-579, § 706(a), 90 Stat. 2793 (1976). Therefore, a county bears the
burden of proving to a court that contemporary R.S. 2477 right-of-ways were
constructed before 1976 and have been used in the same way—without
abandonment—since 1976. See, e.g., S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. BLM, 425 F.3d
735, 768–84 (10th Cir. 2005) (the burden of proof is on party asserting the right-ofway, describing factors that inform validity of claimed road and ruling that courts must
decide validity of right-of-way, not agencies).
130. BAKER COUNTY PLAN, supra note 9, at 19.
131. Id. at 21.
132. See id. at 21–22 (“In the event that range health standards on a permit
or lease are not being met, stocking rates will be reduced only in the event that; 1)
failure to meet range health standards is established on the basis of current, on-theground monitoring data; 2) failure to meet range health standards is shown to be
caused by current, as opposed to historic, livestock management practices; and 3) all
adaptive management approaches have been exhausted.”). The county’s plan would
give federal range managers the discretion to reduce grazing levels only if current

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2920355

2017

PUBLIC LAND & RESOURCES LAW REVIEW

34

unconstitutional under conflict preemption principles.133
The county plan sought to dictate increased logging on public
lands,134 stipulating that “[o]n public lands, all tree mortality caused by
forest fire and pests shall be harvested before additional loss of economic
value occurs, in coordination with the Baker County Board of
Commissioners.”135 According to the county plan, the “County’s forest
resources must be governed in the best interests of local citizens while
promoting the health of the forests.”136 These provisions suggest that local
needs are superior to the needs of other public land users, when in fact, all
Americans hold an equal claim of ownership to federal land.
The county plan claimed that all public lands traditionally open to
mineral exploration must remain open to mining.137 The county plan also
required federal land plans to include discussion of the “economic
importance” of mining to Baker County. 138 Further, the Baker County
plan announced that “mineral development and production are not subject
to unreasonable stipulations, Best Management Practices, mitigation
measures, or reclamation bonds.” 139 Before federal agencies may
withdraw public lands from mining, the plan required federal agencies to
consider and disclose the economic effects of mineral withdrawal to Baker

livestock management is harming the range. See id. at 22 (“[I]f failure to meet
rangeland health standards is not due to current livestock management, stocking rates
shall not be diminished and season of use will not be curtailed.”) (emphasis added).
The plan would also require the agency to allow the harmful amount of grazing to
resume as soon as the range health rebounds. See id. (“When range health returns to
acceptable levels, suspended [animal unit months] shall be returned to active use by
the next grazing season.”).
133. See infra notes 232–235 (explaining these provisions are conflict
preempted).
134. See BAKER COUNTY PLAN, supra note 9, at 25 (“Forest management
practices on public land within Baker County shall include a stable timber-harvesting
program, which is essential to maintain healthy forest ecosystems and to provide
employment and economic security to individuals and businesses in Baker County.”).
135. Id. at 27.
136. Id. at 25.
137. Id. at 30 (“Federal lands historically open for mineral access in Baker
County shall remain open and all proposed road closures shall be coordinated with
Baker County.”).
138. Id. at 30 (“The economic importance of exploration, development
and production of locatable mineral resources shall be incorporated into all federal
management agencies land and resource management plans.”).
139. Id. at 31 (emphasis omitted).
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County’s economy.140 Like the timber resource provisions,141 the county’s
stance on mining assumes that federal agencies must maximize natural
resource production on public lands to benefit local residents.
Baker County’s plan opposed a variety of federal land
management designations, including wilderness designation, 142 and
required that “[m]anagement of lands with wilderness characteristics shall
be coordinated with Baker County.” 143 Likewise, the county opposed
federal Wild and Scenic river designations within the county and appeared
to require federal agencies to co-manage those rivers with the county board
of commissioners. 144 The county is similarly opposed to national
monuments 145 as well as a multitude of other special land use
designations.146
The county assumed an imperious stance on some issues,
declaring, for example, that “Baker County shall direct the US Forest
Service, Bureau of Land Management, [sic] other relevant public agencies
to manage the watershed, including the municipal watersheds, to meet the
multiple needs of residents and promote healthy forests.” 147 The plan
discouraged establishing instream flows meant to improve water quality
and wildlife habitat. 148 It also required federal agencies to incorporate
local fire association plans into federal fire control plans149 and asserted
that whenever “grazing on public lands is temporarily suspended due to
fire, grazing shall recommence on the basis of case-by-case monitoring
and site-specific rangeland health determinations, as opposed to fixed
140. See id. at 31 (“Prior to initiating the administrative withdrawal of
public lands from mineral entry, the agency shall carefully take into account and
document for the record; 1) the impacts to rural communities affected by the
withdrawal; 2) the economic value of the mineral resources foregone; 3) the economic
value of the resources being protected, and; 4) an evaluation of the risk that the
renewable resources within the minerals surface use [sic] regulations.”).
141. See supra notes 134–136.
142. BAKER COUNTY PLAN, supra note 9, at 34.
143. Id. at 34.
144. See id. at 35 (“Any existing or established Wild and Scenic River
occurring within Baker County shall be managed by the designating federal agency in
coordination with Baker County.”).
145. See id. (“Baker County oppose [sic] the use of the Antiquities Act for
designation of National Monuments.”).
146. See id. (expressing county opposition to “National Conservation
Areas, National Research Areas, National Recreation Areas, Outstanding Forest
Areas, Outstanding Natural Areas, Cooperative Management and Protection Areas,
Headwaters Forest Reserves, National Historic Trails and National Scenic Trails”).
147. Id. at 44 (emphasis added).
148. Id. at 40 (“It is Baker County policy that in-stream transfers will be
discouraged through conserved water transfers, instream leases and/or purchases if the
upstream users are negatively impacted from the historic beneficial use.”).
149. Id. at 46.
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timelines.” 150 The county plan seemed to assume that the county
government has plenary authority to control land use decision-making on
federal public lands.
The Baker County Natural Resources Plan aimed to affect nearly
every aspect of federal land planning. The plan employed mandatory
language at length, suggesting to its constituents that the coordination
provisions of FLPMA and NFMA give the county board of commissioners
great power over federal land planning and management decisions. These
suggestions are erroneous interpretations of the county’s role in federal
law.151
V. ANALYZING THE COORDINATION ORDINANCES
Federal law allows some local regulation on federal land. In 1987,
the Supreme Court issued a landmark opinion on federal preemption, land
planning, and environmental regulation in California Coastal Commission
v. Granite Rock Co., which upheld state environmental regulation of
miners on national forests. 152 This Part examines the Granite Rock
decision and subsequent case law153 to consider the extent of permissible
local control over land use on federal land. Using the Baker County,
Oregon Natural Resources Plan as an archetypical coordination ordinance,
it addresses the county plan under the preemption analysis outlined in
Granite Rock:154
[S]tate law can be pre-empted in either of two general
ways. If Congress evidences an intent to occupy a given
field, any state law falling within that field is pre-empted.
If Congress has not entirely displaced state regulation
over the matter in question, state law is still pre-empted to
the extent it actually conflicts with federal law, that is,
when it is impossible to comply with both state and
federal law, or where the state law stands as an obstacle

150. Id. (emphasis added).
151. See infra Section V (addressing the constitutionality of the Baker
County plan under field preemption and conflict preemption analyses).
152. 480 U.S. 572, 594 (1987).
153. See, e.g., Bohmker v. State, 172 F. Supp. 3d 1155, 1164 (D. Or.
2016), appeal docketed, No. 16-35262 (state moratorium on motorized instreammining not preempted because the law was a reasonable environmental regulation);
People v. Rinehart, 377 P.3d 818, 829–30 (Cal. 2016) (state may restrict certain
mining techniques on public lands to protect other resources).
154. The county plan is not expressly preempted because neither NFMA,
FLPMA, nor agency regulations explicitly state that federal land plans preempt state
plans.
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to the accomplishment of the full purposes and objectives
of Congress[.]155
This Part demonstrates that federal law preempts the Baker County plan.
A. County Plans and Field Preemption
In Granite Rock, the Supreme Court presumed that the federal
government has exclusive authority to conduct land use planning on
federal lands.156 The Court distinguished environmental regulation from
land use planning,157 and in the years following Granite Rock, courts have
upheld state and local authority over public lands where the state and local
bodies exercised environmental regulation authority. 158 The county
coordination ordinances, however, are not framed as environmental
regulations. Instead, they operate as land planning directives, which the
Supreme Court would consider unenforceable under field preemption.159
In Granite Rock, the California legislature enacted environmental
regulations for mining operations in the coastal zone. 160 At the time
California adopted the law, the Granite Rock mining company already
operated under a federally-approved plan of operations in the Los Padres
National Forest.161 When the state instructed the company to apply for a
155. Granite Rock, 480 U.S. at 581 (citing Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee
Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984)) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). This
same preemption analysis applies to county ordinances. Hillsborough Cnty., Fla. v.
Automated Med. Lab., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985) (“[F]or the purposes of the
Supremacy Clause, the constitutionality of local ordinances is analyzed in the same
way as that of state laws.”).
156. See infra notes 169–170 and accompanying text.
157. See infra notes 163–165 and accompanying text.
158. See infra notes 184–199 and accompanying text.
159. See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation &
Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 204 (1983) (“Absent explicit preemptive language,
Congress' intent to supersede state law altogether may be found from a ‘scheme of
federal regulation so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left
no room to supplement it,’ ‘because the Act of Congress may touch a field in which
the federal interest is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude
enforcement of state laws on the same subject.”).
160. Granite Rock, 480 U.S. at 576.
161. Id. Granite Rock submitted its five-year plan of operations to the
Forest Service in 1980. Id. In 1981, the Forest Service completed its NEPA analysis
and approved the company’s plan of operations, and Granite Rock began mining. Id.
In 1983, the California law requiring a state environmental permit went into effect,
and Granite Rock filed suit against the state. Id. at 576–77. Granite Rock did not
apply for a state permit, and continued its operations. Id. at 578. By the time the
Supreme Court issued its opinion in 1987, Granite Rock’s plan of operations had
expired. Id. at 577–78.
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state resource protection permit, Granite Rock filed for an injunction in
federal court, arguing the Mining Act of 1872 preempted state
environmental regulations on public land.162
In Granite Rock, the Supreme Court distinguished Congress’s
authority over land use planning from its environmental regulatory powers
on public land. 163 The Court reasoned that land use planning and
environmental regulation are distinct,164 explaining, “[l]and use planning
in essence chooses particular uses for the land; environmental regulation,
at its core, does not mandate particular uses of the land but requires only
that, however the land is used, damage to the environment is kept within
prescribed limits.”165 The Supreme Court viewed the California permit
requirement as a permissible environmental regulation, 166 ruling on
conflict preemption grounds that federal law did not preempt the state’s
resource protection permit requirements because (1) neither the Mining
Act of 1872 nor Forest Service regulations demonstrated congressional
intent to preempt state environmental laws; (2) the state environmental
162. Id. at 577. The plaintiffs in Granite Rock relied on the Ninth Circuit’s
holding in Ventura County v. Gulf Oil Corp. for the rule that states do not hold “veto
power” over federally authorized activities. See Granite Rock Co. v. Cal. Coastal
Comm’n, 590 F. Supp. 1361, 1372–73 (N.D. Cal. 1984). In Ventura County, the Ninth
Circuit considered a county ordinance prohibiting oil exploration without a county
permit in open space zoning areas. 601 F.2d 1080, 1082 (9th Cir. 1979), aff’d without
opinion, 445 U.S. 947 (1980). The court ruled that the Mineral Lands Leasing Act of
1920 conflict-preempted the county ordinance, id. at 1083, explaining “[t]he federal
Government has authorized a specific use of federal lands, and Ventura cannot
prohibit that use, either temporarily or permanently, in an attempt to substitute its
judgment for that of Congress.” Id. at 1084 (emphasis added).
Professor Leshy pondered why the Supreme Court never cited Ventura
County in its Granite Rock analysis, declaring “Ventura’s continuing viability remains
at best a puzzle.” John D. Leshy, Granite Rock and the States’ Influence Over Federal
Land Use, 18 ENVTL. L. 99, 109–11 (1987). Leshy suggested the Court’s decision in
Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609 (1981), “seriously undermined
if not destroyed Ventura County’s precedential value.” Leshy, supra note 162, at 118.
Today, Professors Coggins and Glicksman believe the Ventura County opinion
“probably is no longer good law.” GEORGE C. COGGINS & ROBERT D. GLICKSMAN,
PUBLIC NATURAL RESOURCES LAW 5-32 n.3 (Thomson/West 2d ed., 2007).
163. See Granite Rock, 480 U.S. at 581 (“We agree with Granite Rock that
the Property Clause gives Congress plenary power to legislate the use of the federal
land on which Granite Rock holds its unpatented mining claim. The question in this
case, however, is whether Congress has enacted legislation respecting this federal land
that would pre-empt any requirement that Granite Rock obtain a California Coastal
Commission permit.” (emphasis added)).
164. See id. at 588 (“Congress’[s] treatment of environmental regulation
and land use planning as generally distinguishable calls for this Court to treat them as
distinct, until an actual overlap between the two is demonstrated in a particular case.”).
165. Id. at 587.
166. Id. at 585–89.
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regulation did not ban land uses allowed by the federal government; and
(3) the federal Coastal Zone Management Act167 of 1972 authorized state
regulatory authority in the geographic area of Granite Rock’s mine.168
The Granite Rock decision presumed federal law preempted state
land planning for federal lands.169 Indeed, every Justice on the Granite
Rock Court—which split 5-4 on the validity of the state’s permit
requirement—would have ruled that federal law preempted state land use
planning for federal lands.170 Where the Justices disagreed was on the
issue of whether California’s permit requiring environmental protection
measures infringed on federal land planning.171 The Baker County plan
evinced no intent to serve as an environmental regulation. Instead, it was
framed entirely as a strategy for public land management in Baker
County. 172 In NFMA and FLPMA, Congress granted land planning
authority to federal agencies,173 and the coordination ordinances infringe
on this field of federal regulatory authority.174

167. Pub L. No. 109-58, 86 Stat. 1280 (1972) (codified as amended at 16
U.S.C. §§ 1451–1465 (2012)).
168. Granite Rock, 480 U.S. at 589–93.
169. Id. at 585 (“For purposes of this discussion and without deciding this
issue, we may assume that the combination of the NFMA and the FLPMA pre-empts
the extension of state land use plans onto unpatented mining claims in national forest
lands.”); Id. at 593 (remarking that “federal land use statutes and regulations [arguably
express] an intent to pre-empt state land use planning”).
170. See id. at 585 (O’Connor, J. writing for the majority) (“[W]e may
assume that the combination of the NFMA and the FLPMA pre-empts the extension
of state land use plans onto unpatented mining claims in national forest lands.”); Id. at
600–01( Powell & Stevens, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (Justice
Powell’s dissent from the majority’s distinction between land use planning and
environmental regulation, arguing that both are preempted by federal authority over
public lands); Id. at 607–08 (Scalia & White, JJ., dissenting) (Justice Scalia’s dissent,
arguing the California law “is plainly a land use statute, and the permit that statute
requires Granite Rock to obtain is a land use control device. . . . Since, as the Court's
opinion quite correctly assumes. . . . state exercise of land use authority over federal
lands is pre-empted by federal law, California's permit requirement must be invalid.”).
171. See id.; see also id. at 596 (Powell & Stevens, JJ., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (“FLPMA only requires the Secretary to listen to the States, not
obey them.”).
172. See, e.g., supra notes 128 (road management generally), 130 (roads
accessing economically productive areas), 131 (grazing rates), 135 (timber harvest),
139 (mineral development), 150 (post-fire range management).
173. See supra Section III (discussing federal land use planning under
NFMA and FLPMA).
174. See Granite Rock, 480 U.S at 589 (“If the Federal Government
occupied the field of environmental regulation of unpatented mining claims in national
forests . . . state environmental regulation of Granite Rock's mining activity would be
pre-empted.”).
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After Granite Rock, lower courts refined the extent to which state
environmental regulation could burden Congress’s discretion to regulate
public land uses. In these cases, the courts uniformly viewed the state or
local law in question as environmental regulations, which raised conflict
(but not field) preemption issues.175 Thus, cases following Granite Rock
have yet to explore the Supreme Court’s suggestion in Granite Rock that
federal law occupies the field of federal land planning, thereby preempting
all state or local land planning for public lands.
A good example of a court following Granite Rock is South
Dakota Mining Association v. Lawrence County, involving a countyenacted ordinance that prohibited new permits for surface metal mining in
much of the Black Hills National Forest.176 Because surface mining was
the only profitable technique for local miners, the ordinance functioned as
a de facto ban on all mining in the area.177 When mining companies sued
the county, claiming federal law preempted the mining ban,178 the county
argued the ordinance was “a reasonable environmental regulation of
mining on federal lands.”179 Like the Supreme Court in Granite Rock, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit suggested that
federal land use planning occupied the field of authority to manage public
lands. 180 But because the county law interfered with only one federal
statute, the Eighth Circuit applied the conflict preemption analysis from
Granite Rock,181 reasoning that “[t]he ordinance’s de facto ban on mining
on federal land acts as a clear obstacle to the accomplishment of the
Congressional purposes and objectives embodied in the Mining Act.”182
Consequently, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling that
the county law was unenforceable under conflict preemption.183
The decisions in Granite Rock and South Dakota Mining
Association led a federal district court to decide that federal law did not
175. See infra notes 181, 189, 190, 198, and 208.
176. 155 F.3d 1005, 1007 (8th Cir. 1998).
177. Id. at 1007.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 1009.
180. See id. at 1011 (“A local government cannot prohibit a lawful use of
the sovereign's land that the superior sovereign itself permits and encourages. To do
so offends both the Property Clause and the Supremacy Clause of the federal
Constitution.”); Id. (acknowledging that in Granite Rock, “the Court first assumed
without deciding that state land use regulations, which [the Court] defined as laws
‘that in essence choose[] particular uses of land,’ were preempted.”).
181. Id. at 1009–12.
182. Id. at 1011.
183. S.D. Mining Ass’n v. Lawrence Cnty., 997 F. Supp. 1396, 1405–06
(D.S.D. 1997) (“[T]his Court holds that federal law, specifically the Mining Act of
1872 preempts local law.”), aff’d, 155 F.3d at 1011 (“The district court correctly ruled
that the ordinance was preempted.”).
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preempt a state moratorium on motorized mining in riparian areas.184 In
Bohmker v. State, the Oregon legislature passed a seven-year ban on using
motorized equipment to mine riverbeds and banks to protect water quality
and salmon habitat.185 However, unlike the ordinance in South Dakota
Mining Association, the Oregon law allowed miners to continue using
restricted mechanized equipment outside of protected stream areas, as well
as non-motorized techniques inside the regulated river corridors.186 Like
Granite Rock and South Dakota Mining Association,187 the Bohmker court
distinguished land planning from environmental regulation.188 Relying on
Granite Rock, the court held that the moratorium was “a reasonable
environmental regulation” because the measure aimed to protect fish,
wildlife, water quality, and tribal use. 189 Under Bohmker, a narrowly
tailored, temporally limited restriction of one mining technique in specific
areas—intended to protect the environment—is not a “land use law”
preempted by NFMA or FLPMA.190

184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

Bohmker v. State, 172 F. Supp. 3d 1155, 1164–65 (D. Or. 2016).
Id. at 1159–60.
Id. at 1164–65.
See supra notes 163–165, 180.
See Bohmker, 172 F. Supp. 3d at 1164.

[T]he [Granite Rock] Court found that land use planning and
environmental regulation, while theoretically could overlap in
some cases, are distinct activities, capable of differentiation. ‘Land
use planning in essence chooses particular uses for the land;
environmental regulation, at its core, does not mandate particular
uses of the land but requires only that, however the land is used,
damage to the environment is kept within prescribed limits.’
Because the [Granite Rock] Court found that the stated purpose of
the California permitting scheme was to regulate environmental
effects, not regulate land use, the Court did not reach a decision on
the merits of federal land use preemption. Similarly, the stated
purpose of [the mining ban in Bohmker] is to regulate the
environmental impacts of the prohibited activity—in this case,
motorized instream mining.
Id. (citations omitted).
189. Id. at 1163–64.
190. Id. at 1163–64 (reviewing the Supreme Court’s language in Granite
Rock that state land plans for national forest lands would be preempted by federal
regulations and holding that federal regulations did not preempt the Oregon
moratorium because the state law “does not mandate particular uses of the land, nor
does it prohibit all mining altogether.”). Similarly, in Pringle v. Oregon, a federal
district court upheld Oregon’s ban on recreational suction dredge mining within scenic
waterways because the state allowed all other methods of recreational mining in the
protected areas. No. 2:3-CV-00309, 2014 WL 795328, at *7–8 (D. Or. 2014)
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Under Granite Rock, states may influence which activities are
allowable on public land by imposing environmental protection conditions
not required by the Forest Service or BLM.191 A recent decision by the
Supreme Court of California concerning suction dredge mining is
illustrative. In People v. Rinehart, the court unanimously held that the
state could prohibit suction dredge mining on public lands to protect other
natural resources.192 The defendant miner argued that the banned mining
technique was the only profitable method of mining. 193 Citing South
Dakota Mining Association, 194 the defendant asserted the state law
amounted to a de facto ban on mining and was therefore preempted by the
Mining Law of 1872.195 But the California court distinguished the Eighth
Circuit’s opinion in South Dakota Mining Association, explaining,
“Congress could have made express that it viewed mining as the highest
and best use of federal land wherever minerals were found or could have
delegated to federal agencies exclusive authority to issue permits and
make accommodations between mining and other purposes.”196 However,
it did neither, so the court reasoned that federal mining law required miners
to comply with state law,197 ruling that the state’s ban on suction dredge
mining was not preempted because federal law did not guarantee miners
(rejecting a miner’s argument that the Oregon law operated like the de facto ban on
mining struck down in South Dakota Mining Association).
191. Granite Rock and subsequent cases have not determined what state
or local laws constitute an impermissible land plan because in all of these cases the
courts considered the validity of the contested state laws as environmental regulations.
See supra notes 166, 179, 189, and infra note 206. However, in Granite Rock the
Supreme Court provided some guidance as to the difference between permissible
environmental regulations and impermissible land use laws:
The line between environmental regulation and land use planning
will not always be bright; for example, one may hypothesize a state
environmental regulation so severe that a particular land use would
become commercially impracticable. However, the core activity
described by each phrase is undoubtedly different. Land use
planning in essence chooses particular uses for the land;
environmental regulation, at its core, does not mandate particular
uses of the land but requires only that, however the land is used,
damage to the environment is kept within prescribed limits.
California Coastal Comm’n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572, 587 (1987) (emphasis
added).
192. 377 P.3d 818, 829–30 (Cal. 2016).
193. Id. at 820.
194. Id. at 829–30.
195. Id. at 823–24.
196. Id. at 830.
197. Id.
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“a right to mine immunized from exercises of the states’ police powers.”198
Like the cases before it, Rinehart recognized a state’s authority to regulate
lawful uses of public lands in order to protect the environment.199
Taken together, these cases demonstrate that states and counties
have sufficient authority to require environmental protection measures for
public land users. But with the exception provisions in the Baker County
plan encouraging efforts to combat invasive species on public lands and
address erosion issues,200 the county plan makes no effort to operate as an
environmental regulation. Indeed, every other provision in the county plan
is less environmentally protective than the federal agency’s
requirements.201 Unlike the laws in Granite Rock and subsequent cases,
the Baker County plan functions as a public land management plan, not a
reasonable environmental regulation. Therefore, the county plan is field
preempted by the federal government’s authority to regulate public lands
under NFMA and FLPMA, and serves only as an unenforceable policy
statement.
B. County Plans and Conflict Preemption
In Granite Rock and ensuing cases, courts applied a conflict
preemption analysis to state and county regulations that burdened legal
uses of public land. The Supreme Court has repeatedly explained that “[i]f
Congress has not entirely displaced state regulation over the matter in
question, state law is still pre-empted to the extent it actually conflicts with
federal law[.]” 202 Thus, even if the Baker County plan and other
198. Id. at 820.
199. See id. at 829 (“The federal statutory scheme does not prevent states
from restricting the use of particular mining techniques based on their assessment of
the collateral consequences for other resources.”).
200. See BAKER COUNTY PLAN, supra note 9, at 28–29 (encouraging
“early detection, rapid response and follow-up monitoring” to combat invasive and
noxious species in Baker County); Id. at 41 (“Federal agencies shall work in
partnership with permittees and other land managers on riparian management to
ensure that monitoring data are current, and potential issues regarding stream bank
erosion, channel depth, etc. are addressed early through adaptive management
approaches.”).
201. See supra Section IV.B. (describing county demands and positions
on public land management issues), Section V.B. (discussing conflicts between the
county plan and federal statutes).
202. California Coastal Comm’n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572, 581
(1987) (citing Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984)) (citations
omitted) (emphasis added). This same preemption analysis applies to county
ordinances. Hillsborough Cnty, Fla. v. Automated Med. Lab., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713
(1985) (“[F]or the purposes of the Supremacy Clause, the constitutionality of local
ordinances is analyzed in the same way as that of state laws.”).
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coordination ordinances were not field preempted by NFMA and FLPMA,
the coordination ordinances are still unconstitutional under the Supremacy
Clause if the county plans conflict with federal law.
Several conflict preemption cases are illustrative. In Kleppe v.
New Mexico, the Supreme Court unanimously ruled that a federal law
protecting wild horses and burros preempted a state’s traditional authority
to manage wildlife on public lands.203 The Court affirmed state authority
to regulate civil and criminal issues on public lands but explained that
when Congress enacts public lands legislation, “the federal legislation
necessarily overrides conflicting state laws under the Supremacy
Clause.”204 Consequently, in Granite Rock, the Supreme Court found no
conflict between federal environmental laws and the state environmental
permit requirement.205
None of the Granite Rock line of cases decided whether counties
(as opposed to states) may require environmental protection measures on
federal lands.206 However, in Boundary Backpackers v. Boundary County.,
the Idaho Supreme Court considered the validity of a county ordinance
that required all federal and state land use planning to conform to a county
land use plan.207 The court ruled the entire plan unconstitutional under
conflict preemption.208
203.
204.

426 U.S. 529, 545–46 (1976).
Id. at 543. The Court continued:

The Federal Government does not assert exclusive jurisdiction
over the public lands in New Mexico, and the State is free to
enforce its criminal and civil laws on those lands. But where those
state laws conflict with the Wild Free-roaming Horses and Burros
Act, or with other legislation passed pursuant to the Property
Clause, the law is clear: The state laws must recede.
Id.
205. See supra notes 166–168.
206. In South Dakota Mining Association, Lawrence County argued its
ban on new mining permits was a reasonable environmental regulation, permissible
under Granite Rock. S.D. Mining Ass’n v. Lawrence Cnty., 155 F.3d 1005, 1009 (8th
Cir. 1998). The Eighth Circuit, however, refused to view the law as a reasonable
environmental regulation. See id. at 1011 (“[U]nlike Granite Rock, we are not faced
with a local permit law that sets out reasonable environmental regulations governing
mining activities on federal lands. The ordinance’s de facto ban on mining on federal
land acts as a clear obstacle to the accomplishment of the Congressional purposes and
objectives embodied in the Mining Act.”). Thus, although the court ruled that the
Lawrence County ordinance was not a valid environmental regulation, the court did
not suggest that counties cannot require environmental regulation on public lands.
207. Boundary Backpackers v. Boundary Cnty., 913 P.2d 1141, 1143–44
(Idaho 1995).
208. Id. at 1147–48.
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The county plan in Boundary Backpackers was quite similar to the
Baker County plan, purporting to require federal agencies to obtain county
permission before designating federal wild and scenic rivers, adjusting
federal land boundaries, or revising federal land plans within the county.209
The ordinance also required federal and state agencies to coordinate with
the county board of commissioners prior to taking action that might affect
the county’s plan.210 Similarly, the Baker County plan requires federal
agencies to partner with Baker County commissioners in harvesting
timber211 or managing wild and scenic rivers.212
The Idaho Supreme Court surveyed numerous federal statutes that
conflicted with the local plan’s requirements for federal land
management.213 For example, the county plan prohibited federal agencies
from acquiring property rights in the county without ensuring “parity in
land ownership,” but the court explained that requirement conflicted with
provisions in the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act and FLPMA authorizing
federal land acquisitions. 214 The court noted conflicts between the
Endangered Species Act (“ESA”) and provisions in the county plan
requiring federal agencies to receive county concurrence on changes to
land use plans and wildlife habitat designations.215 The county plan also
conflicted with procedures in the Wilderness Act for the designation of
federal wilderness areas. 216 Consequently, the court declared the
ordinance unenforceable under conflict preemption, citing Granite
Rock, 217 explaining “[n]one of the federal land laws give local
209. Id. at 1144.
210. Id. at 1143–44. The Boundary County plan appears to have defined
“coordination” as compliance with the county plan. See id. at 1143 (quoting from the
plan: “Federal and state agencies proposing actions that will impact [the plan] shall
prepare and submit in writing, and in a timely manner, report(s) on the purposes,
objectives and estimated impacts of such actions, including economic, to [the board].
These report(s) shall be provided to [the board] for review and coordination prior to
federal or state initiation of action.”) (emphasis added); see also id. at 1144 (quoting
from the plan: “Any federally proposed designation of Wild and Scenic Rivers and all
federal policies regarding riparian management in Boundary County shall be
coordinated with [the board] and shall comply with any County water use plan.”)
(emphasis added).
211. See supra note 135.
212. See supra note 144.
213. Boundary Backpackers, 913 P.2d at 1147–48 (reasoning that various
provisions of the county plan conflicted with the Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act of
1960, the Wilderness Act, the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, the Forest and Rangeland
Renewable Resources Planning Act of 1976, the Endangered Species Act, and
FLPMA).
214. Id. at 1147.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 1146.
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governmental units . . . veto power over decisions by federal agencies
charged with managing federal land.” 218 Even though the county
ordinance in Boundary Backpackers contained a severability clause 219
similar to the Baker County plan, 220 the court ruled that the plan was
unconstitutional in its entirety.221
Like the ordinance in Boundary Backpackers, the Baker County
plan is permeated with provisions that conflict with federal land laws. For
instance, the plan requires federal agencies to not acquire or condemn
private property.222 This provision conflicts with FLPMA and the Fifth
Amendment of the United States Constitution, which allow the federal
government to acquire interests in private property by purchase, exchange,
or eminent domain. 223 The Baker County plan also requires federal
agencies to consider Baker County’s “custom and culture” and local
economy in developing recovery efforts under the Endangered Species
Act, 224 and to mitigate the effects of ESA listings on Baker County’s
economy.225 Congress did not require either of these considerations in the
ESA; actually, the statute requires the government’s recovery plans to give
priority to aiding species that are imperiled by economic activity like
development.226
The Baker County plan would allow seemingly unregulated
218. Id. at 1147.
219. Id. at 1148.
220. BAKER COUNTY PLAN, supra note 9, at 3 (“Should a court declare any
part of these policies void, unenforceable, or invalid, the remaining provisions shall
remain in full force and effect.”).
221. See Boundary Backpackers, 913 P.2d at 1148 (“Despite the obvious
intent of the board to preserve the remainder of the ordinance if portions are declared
unconstitutional, the portions of the ordinance that are preempted by federal law are
so integral and indispensable to the ordinance, we conclude the entire ordinance must
fall.”).
222. BAKER COUNTY PLAN, supra note 9, at 13 (“Baker County is
dedicated to preserving [private property interests on public lands], and expects that
federal agencies shall not attempt to terminate, or otherwise demand the transfer or
relinquishment of, such holdings in whole or in part from private individuals.”). The
ordinance struck down in Boundary Backpackers contained a similar provision. See
supra note 214.
223. See 43 U.S.C. § 1715(a) (2012) (“[T]he Secretary, with respect to the
public lands and the Secretary of Agriculture, with respect to the acquisition of access
over non-Federal lands to units of the National Forest System, are authorized to
acquire pursuant to this Act by purchase, exchange, donation, or eminent domain,
lands or interests therein.”); U.S. CONST. amend. V (recognizing the sovereign power
of the federal government to take private property for public use if it provides just
compensation).
224. BAKER COUNTY PLAN, supra note 9, at 36.
225. Id. at 37.
226. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f)(1)(A) (2012).
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mining on federal lands. The county plan announced that “[i]t is the policy
of Baker County that mineral development and production are not subject
to unreasonable stipulations, Best Management Practices, mitigation
measures or reclamation bonds.” 227 However, federal law grants the
Forest Service and BLM considerable authority to approve or disapprove
mining plans and to require bonds or mitigation measures.228 Thus, the
county ordinance clashes with Congress’s directives to the Forest Service
and BLM about managing mineral lands as well as the agencies’
interpretation of this authority to regulate mining.
The county plan also conflicts with federal law on national
monuments, grazing regulation, and alternative energy siting. The
Antiquities Act authorizes the President to establish national monuments
on federal lands,229 but the Baker County plan “opposes the designation of
any National Monument within its borders unless the proposal is
coordinated with the County and is strongly supported by the local
community.” 230 In FLPMA, Congress granted the Forest Service and
BLM the authority to decide grazing closures, 231 but the Baker County
plan requires land managers to satisfy a three-part test before reducing
grazing pressure to improve range health. 232 FLPMA allows the
Secretaries of Interior and Agriculture to grant rights-of-way for energy
production on public land,233 but the county plan proclaims “[e]xcept for
geothermal development, there will be no development of any alternative
energy sources on forestland.”234 The county’s position on all of these
227. BAKER COUNTY PLAN, supra note 9, at 31 (emphasis omitted).
228. See 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b) (“In managing the public lands the Secretary
shall, by regulation or otherwise, take any action necessary to prevent unnecessary or
undue degradation of the lands.”); 43 C.F.R. § 3809.1–900 (2017) (requiring bonds,
plans of operations, reclamation plans, mitigation, and other criteria for mining on
BLM lands); 16 U.S.C. § 478 (2012) (“[Miners] must comply with the rules and
regulations covering such national forests.”); 16 U.S.C. § 551 (2012) (granting the
Secretary of Agriculture authority to regulate the occupancy and use of national
forests, and to protect them from destruction); 36 C.F.R. § 228.1–15 (2017) (requiring
bonds, plans of operations, reclamation plans, mitigation, and other criteria for mining
on Forest Service lands).
229. 54 U.S.C. § 320301 (2012); see, e.g., Santa Rosa and San Jacinto
Mountains National Monument Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-351, 114 Stat. 1362
(2000) (codified at 16 U.S.C. 431 (2012)); Tulare County v. Bush, 306 F.3d 1138,
1144 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (affirming district court’s dismissal of challenge to President’s
authority to designate monuments).
230. BAKER COUNTY PLAN, supra note 9, at 35.
231. 43 U.S.C. § 1752(a) (2012).
232. See supra note 132.
233. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1761–1770.
234. BAKER COUNTY PLAN, supra note 9, at 24. The plan explains the
county’s position as “due to the site disturbance and road building for most types of
energy projects.” Id.
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public land management issues frustrates the purpose of federal law by
attempting to establish public land policies different than Congress
requires. Therefore, under Granite Rock, the Supreme Court would likely
find the Baker County Natural Resources Plan unenforceable under
conflict preemption.235
Under Granite Rock and conflict preemption principles, neither
states nor counties may impose management directives conflicting with
federal law. In South Dakota Mining Association, the Eighth Circuit ruled
that a county ordinance was void under conflict preemption where the
ordinance conflicted with one federal statute.236 Here, the Baker County
plan conflicts with numerous federal statutes, much like the county
ordinance the Idaho Supreme Court ruled unenforceable in Boundary
Backpackers. 237 Thus, even supposing NFMA, FLPMA, and Granite
Rock do not field-preempt coordination ordinances like the Baker County
plan, 238 federal law preempts the Baker County plan under conflictpreemption. On most public lands issues, the Baker County plan is
singularly pro-development, and therefore contrary to agency regulations,
land plans, and statutory directives.
VI. WHAT CAN COUNTIES ACTUALLY DO?
Under NFMA, FLPMA, and agency regulations, county
governments can play an important role in federal land management
decisions. In the existing legal framework, the federal government
encourages local governments to share local perspectives and partner with
agencies in finding solutions to land management issues.239 Coordination
ordinances announcing local sentiment on public lands management may
serve this purpose.

235. See California Coastal Comm’n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572,
581 (1987) (“If Congress has not entirely displaced state regulation over the matter in
question, state law is still pre-empted to the extent it actually conflicts with federal
law, that is, when it is impossible to comply with both state and federal law, or where
the state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress.”) (citing Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248
(1984)) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). This same preemption analysis
applies to county ordinances. Hillsborough Cnty., Fla. v. Automated Med. Lab., Inc.,
471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985) (“[F]or the purposes of the Supremacy Clause, the
constitutionality of local ordinances is analyzed in the same way as that of state
laws.”).
236. See supra notes 181–183.
237. See supra notes 207–221.
238. See supra Section V.A.
239. See supra Section IV.
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The problem with coordination ordinances like the Baker County
plan is that county commissioners seem to believe their ordinances lay the
foundation for negotiation with federal agencies. Although federal law
invites county governments to come to the table ready to teach, learn, or
explore management options, 240 the Baker County plan is rigid and
inflexible on virtually every aspect of federal land use. Counties have the
opportunity to help shape land management decisions because federal land
managers often have discretion in land planning. 241 Unfortunately,
coordination ordinances like the Baker County plan squander the
opportunity to effectively influence public land planning by taking
positions directly contrary to what Congress has required in natural
resources statutes.
Federal law encourages counties to be proactive in engaging their
local land managers on public lands issues. Nearly twenty-five years ago,
an attorney for Harney County, Oregon242 advised the county government,
“[i]f the counties intend to play an effective role in public land
management then we recommend that they become involved early in the
planning process, raise consistency issues early, understand their own
statutory limitations, and provide the federal agencies with clear
statements as to priorities.”243 This advice remains true today. The best
way for counties to influence federal land planning and management

240. See supra Section III (describing the statutory and regulatory
meaning of “coordination” under NFMA and FLPMA).
241. In 1993, Judge Dale White of Harney County, Oregon, requested
attorney Ronald S. Yockim to review a Harney County ordinance that asserted
authority to manage federal lands. See Memorandum from Ronald S. Yockim,
Attorney, to Judge Dale White, Harney Cnty. Court (Dec. 31, 1993). Yockim advised:
[A] local government drafting regulations with respect to federal
lands should give careful attention to whether preemption has
occurred and to what degree the land manager still retains any
discretion to act. It is in those areas where the action has been left
to the discretion of the land manager that the county would have
the most ability to influence federal land management practices.
Id.
242. Harney County is home to the Malheur National Wildlife Refuge,
which the Bundy occupiers seized in January 2016. See supra notes 3–4; see also
Michael C. Blumm & Olivier Jamin, The Property Clause and Its Discontents:
Lessons From the Malheur Refuge Occupation, 43 ECOLOGY L.Q. at 16–18 (reviewing
the Bundy occupation of the Malheur refuge and the group’s constitutional arguments)
(forthcoming 2017), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract =2817205.
243. Id.
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decisions is, as Professor Michelle Bryan has argued, to learn about the
relevant processes and get involved early.244
For example, the Malheur Wildlife Refuge Comprehensive
Conservation Plan (“CCP”) 245 was the result of highly collaborative
planning efforts between federal and local parties.246 In October 2016,
participants in the planning effort for the Malheur refuge—including
ranchers, birdwatchers, and federal land managers—convened at a
conference in Bend, Oregon, to describe their unique partnership. 247
Participants described the importance of building personal relationships
with other stakeholders, getting involved in the planning process early, and
encouraging federal employees like refuge managers to remain in the
community long-term. 248 The process used to formulate the Malheur
Refuge plan deserves emulation. If the counties with coordination
ordinances seek a “bottom-up” approach to land management decisions,
they must engage in the sometimes-tedious federal land planning
processes and prepare to adapt to changing situations, economies, and
pressures on public land resources.

244. See Michelle Bryan, Learning Both Directions: How Better FederalLocal Land Use Collaboration Can Quiet the Call for Federal Land Transfers, 76
MONT. L. REV. 147, 153–54 (2015) (calling for federal agencies and local
governments to “establish ongoing relationships that operate outside of any short-term
planning process.”); Michelle Bryan, Cause for Rebellion? Examining How Federal
Land Management Agencies & Local Governments Collaborate on Land Use
Planning, 6 J. ENERGY & ENVTL. L. 1, 16 (2015) (local government officials “must
become well educated about federal planning to take full advantage of the process.”).
245. The U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service administers National Wildlife
Refuges, see supra note 72, but the principle of early local involvement in the planning
process applies to all federal land management agencies.
246. See Jane Braxton Little, Irony of Malheur Refuge Occupation Seen in
Collaboration Over Federal Land, SACRAMENTO BEE (Dec. 4, 2016),
http://www.sacbee.com/opinion/california-forum/article118385208.html (“The site
the Bundy brothers and their cowboy cohorts chose to showcase government abuse is
home to the High Desert Partnership, a diverse group of ranchers, federal agency
scientists and environmentalists representing more than 30 organizations. The
partnership, which began with familiar exasperation over federal management, has
evolved beyond the refuge in eastern Oregon.”); Les Zaitz, $6 Million Will Go to
Restore Malheur Refuge, Cover Other Costs of Standoff, THE OREGONIAN (Mar. 23,
2016),
http://www.oregonlive.com/oregon-standoff/2016/03/repairs_to_malheur_
refuge_will.html (“Gary Marshall, a longtime local rancher and chairman of the High
Desert Partnership, said years of work by diverse groups arrived at a plan for the
refuge that accounts for all needs, from environmental to economic.”).
247. Oregon Natural Desert Association, Desert Conference: Public
Lands, Common Ground Brings Diverse Voices to Bend October 14, ONDA.ORG (Sept.
16, 2016), https://onda.org/pressroom/press-releases/desert-conference-public-landscommon-ground-brings-diverse-voices-to-bend-october-14.
248. Id.
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The authority counties claim to possess in their coordination
ordinances is, under federal law, reserved for Indian tribes, which possess
a special trust relationship with the federal government.249 Whereas tribes
are expressly mentioned in the Constitution, 250 counties are
constitutionally insignificant.
Executive orders and presidential
memorandums have required federal agencies to grant special consultation
and government-to-government negotiations to tribes.251 Under BLM’s
short-lived Planning 2.0 regulations, 252 BLM committed to “initiate
consultation with Indian tribes on a government-to-government basis
during the preparation and amendment of resource management plans.”253
Many tribes have treaties with the United States, but county governments
have no authority to demand government-to-government negotiations with
the federal government.
Counties have no special standing under federal law. For
example, under FLPMA’s regulations, BLM retains great discretion in
achieving consistency between federal plans and county plans, 254
explaining the objectives of coordination as paying attention to and
considering local plans, suggestions, and public involvement.255 FLPMA
contains no requirement of “government-to-government” consultation

249. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 554–61 (1832) (elaborating
the special trust relationship between federal government and Indian tribes); see, e.g.,
Leigh Paterson, Tribal Consultation at Heart of Pipeline Fight, INSIDE ENERGY (Sept.
23,
2016),
http://insideenergy.org/2016/09/23/tribal-consultation-at-heart-ofpipeline-fight/ (explaining federal agencies’ consultation with tribes in the Standing
Rock and Dakota Access pipeline controversy).
250. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (Indian Commerce Clause).
251. See Memorandum on Tribal Consultation, 74 Fed. Reg. 57,881,
57,881 (Nov. 5, 2009) (charging federal agencies “with engaging in regular and
meaningful consultation and collaboration with tribal officials in the development of
Federal policies that have tribal implications, and . . . strengthening the governmentto-government relationship between the United States and Indian tribes.”); Exec.
Order 13,175, Consultation and Coordination with Indian Tribal Governments, 65
Fed. Reg. 67,249, 67,249–50 (Nov. 6, 2000) (granting tribes opportunities for
consultation, “government-to-government” collaboration, and administrative
discretion).
252. See supra note 85 (reviewing changes to BLM’s FLPMA regulations
that went into effect January 2017, but were rescinded in March 2017).
253. 43 C.F.R. § 1610.3–1 (2017). This provision in FLPMA regulations
is new in 2017, as the previous version 43 C.F.R. § 1610.3 did not require governmentto-government consultation with tribes. See supra note 85 (discussing the revised
FLPMA regulations and new provision regarding consultation with Indian tribes).
254. See 81 Fed. Reg. 89,580, 89,618–19 (Dec. 12, 2016) (quoting the
2016 and Planning 2.0 “Consistency requirements” FLPMA regulations and
explaining the differences therein).
255. See supra notes 82–85 and accompanying text.
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with counties. Nor does the statute require federal decisions to be
consistent with local plans.256
Even if federal government had the resources to grant
"government-to-government" status to local governments—hardly clear—
why should it? Doing so would promote monopolization of resource use
by giving special status to local plans, thereby elevating those controlling
local government—no doubt local economic leaders—great control over
public lands at the expense of all the other owners of federal public
lands.257 The vast majority of American citizens do not live close to lands
they own that would be effectively monopolized by local control. Indeed,
many Americans live so far away from western public lands that their
ability to exercise their ownership share is materially diminished by that
distance. The “public” in public land law has generally implicitly favored
the local as opposed to the regional or national publics. 258 Giving
government-to-governmental special status to local county plans would
exacerbate this already unbalanced view of the relevant public in public
land law.
Changes to the FLPMA planning regulations may occur despite
the terms of the Congressional Review Act (“CRA”), which Congress
invoked to rescind BLM’s 2.0 planning regulations,259 include a provision
ostensibly prohibiting agencies from drafting new regulations on the same
topic as regulations rescinded under the CRA.260 Nonetheless, on March
27, 2017, Secretary of the Interior Ryan Zinke directed BLM’s Acting
Director to “immediately begin a focused effort to identify and implement
results-oriented improvements to [the agency’s] land use planning and
256. See OWYHEE CNTY., IDAHO, 179 IBLA 18, 28–33 (2010) (FLPMA
does not require BLM’s travel management plans to be consistent with county
ordinances or resolutions on off-highway vehicle use, and BLM fulfilled its obligation
to coordinate by maintaining communication with county government).
257. For an argument that public participation in public land planning
requires the land manager to bring together representatives of all legitimate interests
to work out acceptable comprises, see Owen Olpin, Toward Jeffersonian Governance
of Public Lands, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 959 (1994). Giving special status to local
governments would not be consistent with this paradigm.
258. See, e.g., Joseph M. Feller, Ride ‘Em Cowboy: A Critical Look at
BLM’s Proposed Grazing Regulations, 34 ENVTL. L. 1123, 1140–42 (2004)
(describing one way BLM proposed changing grazing regulations to “exclude nonranchers from management decisions and stall implementation of environmental
standards.”).
259. See supra note 85.
260. See 5 U.S.C. § 801(b)(2) (2012) (“A rule that does not take effect (or
does not continue) under paragraph (1) may not be reissued in substantially the same
form, and a new rule that is substantially the same as such a rule may not be issued,
unless the reissued or new rule is specifically authorized by a law enacted after the
date of the joint resolution disapproving the original rule.”).
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NEPA processes.”261 Secretary Zinke’s memorandum directed BLM to
evaluate how “a new rulemaking” 262 could address numerous criteria,
including “the needs of state and local governments.”263 In early May
2017, Secretary Zinke suspended meetings of BLM’s resource advisory
councils as part of a review of advisory councils throughout the Interior
Department, 264 suggesting that any new planning rules may take some
time, particularly in light of the fact that Secretary Zinke is also reviewing
the propriety of the designation of some twenty-seven national monuments
proclaimed over the past twenty years.265
VII. CONCLUSION
County governments and people living near public lands hold
legitimate and useful perspectives on federal lands management. NFMA
and FLPMA require federal agencies to consider these viewpoints. On
some issues, federal law grants local residents special authority to inform
management decisions on public lands. 266 However, the coordination
provisions in NFMA and FLPMA do not require the federal government
to engage in government-to-government consultation or negotiations with
counties in making public land management decisions. Special interest
groups like ALEC, the Public Lands Council, and American Stewards of
261. Memorandum from Ryan Zinke, Sec’y, Department of the Interior,
to Acting Dir., BLM, (Mar. 27, 2017), available at https://www.eenews.net/assets/
2017/04/18/document_pm_01.pdf.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. See Scott Streater, Agency suspends advisory panels even as
decisions loom, GREENWIRE (E & E News) (May 5, 2017), available at https://www.
eenews.net/stories/1060054139.
265. See Jennifer Yacknin, National Monuments: Final review list
includes Maine, Colo. Sites, GREENWIRE (E & E News) (May 8, 2017), available at
https://www.eenews.net/greenwire/2017/05/08/stories/1060054205.
266. In NRDC v. Hodel, a federal district court rejected BLM regulations
that gave ranchers the authority to make range management decisions because the
Taylor Grazing Act, FLPMA, and Public Rangelands Improvement Act required
federal agencies to manage public lands. 618 F. Supp. 848, 868–71 (E.D. Cal. 1985).
The agency proceeded to revise its regulations to allow local participation through
“resource advisory councils,” which require representation by local communities. See
43 C.F.R. § 1784.6-1 (2017); 60 Fed. Reg. 9,958, 9,896 (Feb 22, 1995) (explaining
the three groups from which RAC members are selected, including representatives of
grazing interests and local governments). However, the unlawful delegation doctrine
limits agency authority to grant decision-making authority to local entities. See, e.g.,
Nat’l Park & Conservation Ass’n v. Stanton, 54 F. Supp. 2d 7, 18–21 (D.D.C. 1999)
(the National Park Service violated the unlawful delegation doctrine by conveying its
management and decision-making responsibilities for wild and scenic river to local
council).
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Liberty have misled county governments into asserting an authority that
does not exist in federal law. Coordination ordinances like the Baker
County Natural Resources Plan are preempted and unenforceable under
the Supremacy Clause.
Under the Supreme Court’s Granite Rock decision, states and
counties may enact reasonable environmental regulations regarding uses
of public land allowed by the federal government. As a representative
coordination ordinance, the Baker County plan is—at most—an
unenforceable policy statement. Although counties lack authority to usurp
or control federal land planning, county governments can play a valuable
role if they work collaboratively with federal land managers to help make
informed decisions. 267 If county plans operate as starting points from
which county governments work towards cooperative land management
solutions, the plans may become useful components of federal public land
planning.268 But county plans have no constitutional authority to control
management of federal lands that are owned by all of the American public,
not just local county residents.

267. See supra note 244.
268. Reflecting on the Sagebrush Rebellion in 1982, Governor of Arizona
Bruce Babbitt opined:
Both the states and the federal government share a common trust:
the public good. They ought to be collaborators rather than
adversaries. By working toward a truly cooperative regime of
public land management, they may improve both the public
welfare and the health of the intergovernmental system.
See Babbitt, supra note 56, at 861.
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